As the world inches closer to all-out war in three theatres, it needs rational leaders 

There are inter-state conflicts, and then there are conflicts, with a capital “C”. One often-touted truism about international conflicts is that all warfare ultimately ends in negotiations, implying that reaching the conclusion for any conflict should be something that is amenable to rational thought by the combatants. 

But combat, obviously, is not, after all, an entirely rational action for problem-solving, despite Von Clausewitz’s similarly often-quoted guidance, “War is the continuation of politics by other means”. 

We must, therefore, acknowledge that the inevitability of negotiations to end conflicts is not an entirely accurate or comprehensive one. In fact, international enmity between states can transcend rational thought and give rise to cycles of combat between nations (or ethnicities) lasting generations. 

Consider how World War 2 ended. That global conflict did not happen through negotiations between two sets of exhausted adversaries. One side persevered until there were unconditional surrenders by the Germans and Japanese –  but only after they had been beaten conclusively, and at enormous cost to all of the adversaries. (In fact, the Japanese army nearly decided to fight on, despite the nuclear destruction of two cities, the Soviet Union joining in August 1945 as a combatant and the reality of the near starvation of the country’s population.) 

Those two unconditional surrenders were followed by periods of occupation by the Allied nations, and the occupiers’ attempts to reshape fundamentally those two societies, their economies and their politics, to move past an unending cycle of violence. 

But the Eastern European nations, ostensibly victims in that war, also ended up being occupied by Soviet armies. That country’s leaders carried out forced efforts to restructure those societies along the lines of authoritarian Stalinist economic and political doctrine. 

In the larger lens of history, conflicts more often have ended by the abject surrender of one side, rather than via negotiations. Throughout history, the end of conflict has frequently led to the forced exile or forcible assimilation of what was left of a subject nation that was defeated in warfare. This comes down to us through stories in classical and other ancient literature recounting the fates of ancient peoples. (“Come Nineveh; come Tyre,” anyone?)

But also consider the fact that the 99-year period between the end of the Napoleonic era and the onset of World War 1 was a remarkably peaceful period in European history – with no major war engaging all the great powers. It was a period at odds with centuries before it – and then the century to our own time. 

True, there were numerous smaller wars as the period was obviously not without conflict. These included the Austro-Prussian, the Prussian/Austrian-Danish, the Franco-Prussian and the Crimean Wars as well as various insurrections and ethnic persecutions in numerous countries. But all of Europe’s great powers were never drawn into conflict simultaneously or comprehensively, and entire nations on the continent were not subjugated to massive depredations by another power. 

Instead, international conflict was largely pushed to the periphery of Europe, or in competitions for the conquest of new empires by the French, German, British, Dutch, Belgians, Russians and Italians (and the Japanese, Americans and Abyssinians eventually as well). This fed on the progressive disintegration of older empires such as the Ottoman, Mughal, Chinese, the remnants of the old Spanish empire and the conquest of other less well-defended societies. 

This occurred in tandem with growing commercial competition through an expansion of international trade in both primary commodities and manufactured items, and modern banking modes. This was especially the case as new technologies such as steam power, electricity and telegraphy were brought to bear, giving European societies a decisive edge against would-be competitors. 

Nevertheless, several times, major European powers came close to major hostilities. There was the “Great Game” between Britain and Russia in Central Asia; and hostilities between Russia and Austria over conflicting allegiances and sovereignties in the Balkans; between France and Britain in Africa that almost exploded from a confrontation at Fashoda in Sudan; or between France and Germany at Algeciras over conflicting claims for influence and colonial tutelage in Morocco. 

But throughout that 99-year period, those conflicts never rose to the level of general continental warfare, as a conservative (even reactionary in many ways) “Concert of Europe” –  fashioned among the major powers after the fall of Napoleon and then a balance of alliances –held fast to mitigate the spread of conflicts. That remained true until a single bullet killed the heir to the Hapsburg throne in Sarajevo, shattering the tranquillity of the 1914 summer. The continent-wide system of competing alliances, the vast, industrially supported armies and their inexorable train schedules to move troops to combat zones did the rest – it unleashed three decades of destruction that began with World War 1 and ran through World War 2.

In the post-World War 2 period until the end of the Cold War, a new version of a global balance came to be. This was true even as the wave of decolonisation sweeping through Asia and Africa, the Cold War divide that ran through the centre of Europe and the slow rise of China after the retreat of the Nationalists to Taiwan all putatively set up multiple possibilities for new conflicts to break out. 

In Europe, while the Soviet Union crushed revolts in its client states of East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the West chose not to intervene overtly, beyond issuing severe reprimands and admitting refugees from those various revolts. 

In East Asia, despite the severe, protracted fighting in Korea in which the US was the lead force of a UN military effort against North Korean invaders, later supported by Chinese ground forces, there was still no direct confrontation between the US and China. In the subsequent Vietnam conflict – one which saw the US dispatch half a million military personnel to Southeast Asia in a losing effort to hold off the Viet Minh and Viet Cong takeover of South Vietnam, in a conflict that eventually enveloped neighbouring Laos and Cambodia as well (at vast cost to local populations) – the US and China never engaged in full-on combat. In fact, in East Asia, despite ongoing American fighting in Southeast Asia, China and the US still reached a cautious modus vivendi that prevailed for decades.

The global geopolitical environment changed dramatically in the heady days that came in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet system and the breakup of its empire. That period was also marked by China’s increasingly systematic, hopeful engagement with the global economic system, symbolised by its entry into the World Trade Organisation and its transformation into the world’s workshop. 

That was then, and this is now, however. And now is very different from those earlier eras, and here we get to the potential precipice of our time.

Besides smaller but horrific conflicts such as the ones in Sudan or the eastern Congo which are marginal sites for big power conflict but devastating for the populations of those states, there are two conflicts and potential third that may evolve into opportunities for things to go very, very badly wrong. The first is the ongoing Russian assault on Ukraine, the second is the complex Middle East conflict, and the third is a drive for the expansion of a Chinese presence in the South China Sea and beyond. Each represents a dangerous opportunity for a major national collision that may be unchecked by other restraints.

The ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine and its aerial attacks on population centres and essential infrastructure and the potential for an expansion of the combat zone and active participants in combat represent dangerous possibilities for a face-to-face confrontation of great powers. Such an occurrence could well get out of control, by accident or design, if for example, fighter pilots engage in actual aerial combat at or near the border of a Nato nation. 

An expansion of this conflict beyond its current arena of combat would produce in orders of magnitude more death and destruction in Europe and beyond, because the informal but real restraints on superpower combat during the Cold War era have virtually evaporated. And this comes as Russia is eager to reassert its primacy on the global stage, demonstrating it can punish the West and a nation the West supports.

This can be particularly destabilising as Russian officials continue to muse publicly about unleashing its nuclear arsenal, should Ukrainians expand their attacks on targets inside Russia – using weapons supplied by Nato nations. So far, such weaponry has underpinned Ukraine’s surprisingly vigorous resistance to Russia’s invasion. But if the field of conflict expands, there are growing chances for the kinds of accidental encounters that could trigger yet wider conflict and combat. 

Such an event could be that accidental, chance encounter between fighter jet pilots patrolling a border zone or an errant missile or drone attack on the location of political leadership, triggering increasingly unrestrained reprisals and rapid movements up the escalatory stairway, even if the relevant political leadership cadres do not wish to do so. It is important to recall that during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, a Soviet submarine nearly launched missiles in the midst of that confrontation owing to communications failures. That would have led to almost unimaginable consequences in which the survivors might well have envied the dead. The increasing use of drone technology and the eventual use of autonomous fighting capabilities could render the current conflict even more unstable than the 1962 experience.

Further to the East, in the South China Sea, an increasingly resurgent China is expanding its military presence on the small islands and shoals of that strategically important zone. Here China is asserting territorial control of that sea (and influence beyond), potentially affecting all innocent passage through a major global trade route, beyond the naval presence by other nations. It is also contesting all contending claims by smaller nations such as the Philippines and Vietnam which border this sea — and China is increasingly enforcing its position by building military facilities on some of the islands and engaging in belligerent actions against other nations’ patrol vessels. 

Concurrently, the US has expressed full support for those smaller nations in the South China Sea. In addition, it has created or reestablished security relationships with those smaller nations and reenergised its multilateral security alignment with Japan, Australia and even – to some degree – with India. 

With little dialogue between the US and China on security matters at present, and given the wide range of issues over which they disagree, such as investment and trade and policy, the possibilities exist for unanticipated, accidental military encounters that could escalate quickly and painfully — and which might well spread well beyond an initial encounter. 

All of this is without even taking into account the possibilities of open conflict between China and Taiwan. This could come about because of China’s insistence that the island is an integral part of China and that it must be reunited with China – in some way, and at some time in the foreseeable future.

The third space for the further spread of conflict, of course, is the Middle East. This area is already the site of confrontations, threats and actual combat – each of which is well-positioned for unpredictable escalations. The particular danger here is the multiplicity of actors – state and non-state, both – all with different motives, goals and objectives, but almost all now possessing major stores of lethal weaponry. The region stretches from Iran to Syria, Lebanon and Israel, includes the West Bank and Gaza and also encompasses Saudi Arabia and neighbouring Yemen. Besides the actual combat in the named places, these conflict zones can – and have – impaired international shipping in the Red Sea to the Suez Canal and the production and export of petroleum and natural gas — all having global consequences.

Beyond the national actors, there are non-state actors such as Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthi and groups of Israeli settlers, among others, as well as international actors further afield but actively involved, such as the US and Russia. The place is a repository of lethal weaponry in the hands of state and non-state actors, ranging from drone and missile technology to – potentially – nuclear weapons, as well as the newest introduction of weaponised, lethal communications technology such as pagers and walkie talkies. The quality – and even the rationality – of a number of the political leaders in control of military or paramilitary forces is not reassuring. 

Realistically, it is far too easy to imagine an attack by one side or another that goes wildly awry, devastating sacred sites or territories – or producing yet further massive casualties, beyond those that have already happened. Here again, there is the potential for lethal escalation looms large and, so far, unimpeded. 

Perhaps the worst possible thing for global stability is to imagine the merging of these three conflict zones, somehow and in some way, perhaps when one of these conflict zones erupts into a direct big power military confrontation, giving encouragement to some in the other two areas to take further advantage of the rapidly deteriorating situation for their decisive gain. Who in this world has the ability to bring these conflicts under control and restraint? 

Here in 2024, there is no real equivalent of the “Concert of Europe” or even the relative stability of the Cold War – certainly not the UN or any other multilateral bodies. And it is not at all clear that  the various protagonists are led by thoughtful, careful, realistic, long-term, strategic-thinking leaders. 

Instead, there is reason to believe the collective leadership cadre may well become even less capable and cogent, if more nationalist, populist leaders get elected – or seize power. This current chaos should give no one much optimism. Whoever is the next US president will have a host of tough calls to make in any efforts to deal with these potential crises, beyond those places’ already difficult circumstances. 

But to cut to the chase. If Donald Trump wins his upcoming presidential election, and as we think of these three conflict zones, imagine him joining the likes of Hamas’s Yahya Sinwar, Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah, Israel’s Binyamin Netanyahu, Russia’s Vladimir Putin, and Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei – all men with their inner demons and obsessions. The most rational actors in those three conflict zones would then seem to be China’s Xi Jinping and Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelensky. Where are we then, hey? DM