Turkey and Africa — Deciphering Erdoğan’s intentions, beyond trade, investment and mediation

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Turkey (Türkiye) may not be quite ‘a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma’ as Winston Churchill described the Soviet Union in 1939 after its incongruous pact with Nazi Germany. But its foreign policy can sometimes be enigmatic. 

Last week, Turkey was reportedly invited to become a BRICS member. How, many asked, does a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato) member join an association dominated by Nato’s only two identified foes, Russia and China? 

In Africa, Erdoğan also surprised friend and foe alike in 2019 when Turkey intervened in Libya’s civil war to stop Khalifa Haftar from capturing Tripoli. Recently he has been trying to reconcile two of his closest African allies, Somalia and Ethiopia, which have fallen out over Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland’s independence in exchange for access to the sea. 

That mediation dilemma dates back to 2011. When countries were deserting Somalia because al-Shabaab’s terrorism made it too dangerous, Erdoğan visited the country to show support. He returned in 2016 to open an embassy. Conversely, he endeared himself to Ethiopia by supplying it with drones in 2021, which helped prevent rebel Tigrayan forces from capturing Addis Ababa. 

So in a sense that makes Turkey a neutral broker – but the country is also perceived to be closer to Somalia, especially after it signed a new defence pact with Mogadishu in February. Erdoğan is the master of surprise, of seizing opportunities. 

On the surface, his Africa policy looks quite orthodox. As a G20 member, Turkey evidently feels it necessary to engage the continent as many other G20 powers have – for instance to bolster support in the United Nations. This weekend, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan will chair a Turkey-Africa Ministerial Review Conference meeting with counterparts from 14 African countries ahead of the fourth Turkey-Africa summit in 2026. 

This is part of a major outreach to Africa, which Erdoğan greatly boosted. Writing in 2023, former Turkish ambassador Numan Hazar noted that since 1998, the number of embassies on the continent has mushroomed from 12 to 44, while African embassies in Ankara have increased from 10 in 2008 to 38 today. Since becoming prime minister in 2003 and president in 2014, Erdoğan has visited 31 African countries. 

Total trade with Africa increased from US$5.4-billion in 2003 to US$40.7-billion in 2022. Turkey’s overall investment stock in Africa, focusing on infrastructure, education and healthcare, totals US$6-billion. Turkish contractors have built 1,296 projects worth US$82.6-billion. 

Hazar points out that the late former South African ambassador to Ankara, Tom Wheeler, said Turkey used its soft power to expand its influence in Africa, yet didn’t attract the negative reactions other countries faced. This could partly be because Turkey doesn’t carry any colonial baggage. This lack of any threat perception would be remarkable, considering that Turkey has considerably expanded its military presence in Africa.

As Ali Bilgic, Professor of International Relations and Middle East Politics at Britain’s Loughborough University, told ISS Today: “Turkey has made notable strides in realising its ambition to become a key economic, humanitarian and military power in sub-Saharan Africa. Establishing military bases, such as the one in Somalia, and training local forces have solidified its geopolitical presence.”

He notes that as Islamist terrorists have increasingly targeted West African states such as Niger, Togo, Burkina Faso and Mali, Turkey has been selling these countries drones. 

‘Turkey’s defence industry has grown significantly, with numerous contracts signed across Africa. For instance, Turkey has supplied Bayraktar TB2 drones to Ethiopia and Libya … Additionally, Turkey has agreements to provide military training and equipment to nations such as Somalia, further cementing its influence in the region.”

Bilgic sees Ankara’s efforts to mediate the standoff between Ethiopia and Somalia as a “diplomatic balancing act motivated by Ankara’s strategic interest in maintaining stability in the Horn of Africa”.

However, the balancing act is becoming difficult as Ethiopia has expressed concerns about Turkey’s deepening relationship with Somalia, particularly its military support, “which it perceives as a potential threat to its own security”. This has postponed Ankara’s mediation efforts. 

Bilgic says Turkey’s more assertive foreign policy has also strained relations with Nato allies and the European Union.

He doesn’t find Turkey’s potential inclusion in BRICS incongruous, despite its Nato membership. This instead “reflects Erdoğan’s multifaceted foreign policy approach. This move is not seen as an alternative to Nato or the West but as part of a realist policy where Ankara seeks to engage with all parties. This approach means Turkey does not have eternal friends or enemies, only partners.”

Erdoğan’s ambiguous approach is also evident in how he governs his own country. It’s ostensibly a democracy that holds regular elections. But Freedom House assesses Turkey to be “not free”, saying Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party had become “increasingly authoritarian in recent years, consolidating significant power through constitutional changes and by imprisoning opponents and critics”.

The recent death in exile of Fethullah Gülen, spiritual leader of the moderate Islamic Gülen or Hizmet movement, raises another aspect of the ambiguities of Erdoğan’s Turkey. He and Gülen were once allies but fell out in 2011 when Erdoğan accused the Gülenists of trying to overthrow the government. The Erdoğan government also accused them of instigating the abortive 2016 coup – and branded them a terrorist organisation. 

Africa has also become a terrain of Erdoğan’s struggle against Hizmet, as the movement runs schools in South Africa, Mozambique, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda, Central African Republic, Nigeria, Ghana and Egypt, say Hizmet sources. Turkey has pressured African countries to close Hizmet schools or detain its members, they say, and several have done so. 

This pressure has provoked tensions with some governments, including South Africa. Hizmet believes one of the motives for Erdoğan’s outreach to Africa, including aid and investment, has been to acquire the leverage to pressure countries to stifle Hizmet. 

Erdoğan has also been able to counter his regional Middle East rivals on African soil, such as Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which backed Hafter in Libya. And his increasing military support for Somalia helps block the UAE, which backs Somaliland. 

Erdoğan’s ostensible reasons for expanding Turkey’s African footprint are no doubt genuine – trade, investment, humanitarian aid and national and regional stability. But it seems Africa is also a stage for him to pursue his ambition for Turkey to be a global player. DM

Peter Fabricius is a consultant at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in Pretoria.

First published by ISS Today