Beyond the ballot — the Government of National Unity and global politics

When we met here last year and discussed the need for a reset, we could not have guessed that the electorate would rearrange the political scene the way it did in May.

Now that we have a Government of National Unity, some people seem to think we have achieved a reset by default. This new governance arrangement, however, is not a change in direction or a determination of a new agenda for the country. For most of the players, it is just better to be inside the tent than outside.

So, how can the GNU sustain and achieve coherence? It certainly cannot do so if the main parties cling to old ideas and politics. There must be a concerted effort to build a new political centre that better represents the needs and aspirations of the majority of South Africans. The formation of a new political centre could also improve investor sentiment, with capital inflows softening fiscal constraints and easing financial conditions. The opportunity to build a new momentum of growth creates the economic “breathing space” to plan and execute a deeper and more fundamental socioeconomic reset.

I will focus briefly on five issues.

• The first concerns the global context, particularly the pressures on centrist politics from forces on the extreme left and right. South Africa needs to act strategically on the global and on the African stage to pursue its domestic economic interests in a principled and consistent fashion – what has been modelled as a “swing state”.


• The second point looks at why South Africa needs to build a stable political centre and whether this centre can be marshalled behind a progressive pathway that tilts the balance of forces in favour of growth and transformation.


• The third relates to a shared minimum programme between the diverse forces that constitute the GNU.


• Fourth, there needs to be agreement on pathways that sustainably grow and equalise the economy in self-reinforcing ways. A broader vision of change is necessary to include large swathes of society who might feel excluded from the GNU deal.


• Finally, I will share some thoughts on the process going forward.

The global context 

The past few years have witnessed the rise of geopolitical tensions not seen in a generation. New challenges and opportunities have been created by the shift towards a multipolar world and the emergence of new technologies associated with the energy transition and artificial intelligence. Growth in Africa continues to lag but opportunity knocks for Africa if the leadership vacuum can be filled.

Global peace has been shattered by seemingly intractable conflicts in Ukraine/Russia, Israel/Palestine, and Sudan that have threatened to split the world into two adversarial power blocs – the US and the “West” versus China, Russia, Iran, and allies in the global south. Competition between China and the US/West and the rise of middle powers such as the UAE, India and Turkey are reconfiguring the geopolitical map.

Amidst the global tumult, South Africa’s foreign relations should be based on strong, mutually beneficial economic partnerships. As the World Economic Forum points out, global trade is being rerouted, supply chains are being redesigned and new security alliances are being forged all over the world.

Global trade flows are no longer simply commercial, but matters of geopolitical alignment. Commercial trade interactions will increasingly be based on alliances and friendships between countries: friend-shoring. Trade flows are also being redirected by security threats and regional wars.

With strategic thinking and action, South Africa can position itself at the intersection between the supply chains of the West and the China axis, and as a gateway to the African market. While remaining politically principled, we should remind ourselves that foreign policy is more about securing national interests than it is about keeping friends and being dragged into other nation’s agendas.

South Africa has long been deeply integrated into the Western economic bloc. New global realities point to the challenge of navigating towards a more diverse global architecture, where we can build new and stronger ties to the East and deepen our integration with the African continent without endangering our existing economic relations.

Like India and Brazil, South Africa could play the role of strategic “swing state”, described by Alejo Czerwonko as countries which leverage their spot in a multipolar world as “middle powers” using their ability to avoid picking sides to their advantage, ultimately to pursue their domestic interests with flexibility.

South Africa’s leverage as a swing state includes its strategic position in Africa. The key to our foreign policy is to fill the leadership void in Africa and spend more time building bilateral alliances on the continent with like-minded countries, as well as developing the strength and capacity of regional and international multilateral organisations.

Across the world, dividing lines are increasingly within societies and not between them. The centre, whether in democracies or more authoritarian societies, is under attack from populists of the extreme left and right; and by people identifying with groups, tribes and fundamentalist religions that are willing to resort to violence to further their aims or extinguish their rivals.

If Donald Trump wins the election, the guardrails of the US constitution might be stripped away, creating a new authoritarianism grounded in racist ideology. This will likely resonate in other parts of the world.

The Democratic Party is presenting itself as a new progressive centre. Even if Kamala Harris wins, liberal democracies will be put on notice to deliver better, more egalitarian economic outcomes.

This year, centrists have been fighting back with electoral outcomes in Senegal, the UK, Poland, France and South Africa. The failed exceptions – such as Venezuela and Bangladesh, where authoritarians sought to manipulate the outcome of elections – prove the rule that instability is more likely to emerge from a flawed election than a smoothly democratic one.

It is those societies where the centrists are weakest – such as Israel and Russia – that the prospects of violence are highest and the possibilities for peace are least favourable.

Looking at this global experience, it appears that two clear and very contradictory trends are on the rise – (1) anti-democratic populism often accompanied by racism, fascism and war-mongering, and (2) the consolidation of centrist politics committed to democracy, and open to progressive solutions. And more often, it seems a direct choice between these two, with very different consequences and prospects.

Pathways and prospects 

In South Africa, the choice has been cast as that between two competing power blocs – one supporting the Constitution and democratic rights, and the other a more populist and authoritarian bloc. The latter supports a shift to unrestrained popular sovereignty, replacing constitutional checks and balances with parliamentary supremacy, and replacing democratic organisation with unelected “leaders-for-life” and militaristic “commanders-in-chief”.

The extent to which the GNU can sustain itself depends very much on the two main parties, the ANC and the DA – in terms of relations between the two and their own internal dynamics.

The May elections saw the ANC shed some of its populist elements. Potentially, this could allow for more political coherence and its renewal as a modern social democratic party. Much will depend on the ANC’s leadership capacity and whether it is prepared to forego the party-state-business patronage systems upon which leadership campaigns at all levels have been built.

Alliance dynamics, especially the role of public sector workers, is a sensitive area. In addition, economic populism still commands widespread sympathy amongst ANC leaders and members, raising questions about how deep the reformist bloc runs in the party. The GNU itself is likely to be the subject of attack from within, particularly around the narrative of minority rights constraining transformation.

The main challenge for the DA, other than its own leadership challenges, is being able to transcend its core purpose as a defender of minority rights.

There could be major risks to the GNU over the next few years that could only be countered if it establishes coherence and solidifies with societal support.

As the local government elections in 2026 approach, the parties will go to battle against each other. Sustaining the GNU as political parties maul each other on the campaign trail will require political maturity. As witnessed in the past week, with fissures over domestic and foreign policy, political expediency tends to trump political maturity.

If the ANC sheds more support from 2024, this will embolden the anti-GNU faction. Against the backdrop of collapsing services in many ANC-led municipalities, this might be difficult to avoid.

Next will come the ANC’s 2027 elective conference. As with past conferences, ANC leadership battles are brutal and factions are not beyond holding the country hostage. The GNU could be the attack point for contenders to the throne.

The third relates to the broader economy and whether levels of growth, investment and employment tangibly improve. While sentiment is improving, investors are closely monitoring domestic capital investment before making decisive moves. A tangible and clear improvement in the growth trajectory over the next 12 to 18 months could make or break the GNU. Important too will be how much cost-of-living pressures ease.

So, it is hard to call the future.

One scenario is the GNU holding until 2029, with another centrist coalition thereafter assuming power. This might provide policy and institutional stability but runs the risk of being too narrow an elite pact. This will be less of an issue if the current arrangement delivers growth, and preferably some transformational outcomes.

A second scenario is the ANC regaining its majority as economic reforms yield success and government performance improves. This also depends on the 2027 ANC conference outcome and how patronage networks influence the direction of the party.

A third scenario could be the defeat of the ANC’s progressive leadership in 2027, leading it to replace the GNU with a more populist coalition even before the next national elections.

Another scenario is a 2029 electoral victory for an anti-democratic populist coalition, which would have severe consequences for stability and policy direction.

Minimum programme 

A minimum programme embedded across a broad range of social formations is needed to sustain the new political centre. This is critical to counter the view of the GNU as an overly narrow elite pact of white minority interests, established business, and the political elite.

The initial elements of a minimum programme of the GNU should involve a continuation and acceleration of the reform agenda. Its survival depends on an economic turnaround from the stagnation of recent years, and this clearly requires action to:

• Permanently end load shedding and reform the electricity supply industry.


• Restore rail and port infrastructure.


• Targeted police actions to act against the theft of network infrastructures, “construction mafias”, extortionists, and other threats to business operations.


• Maintain fiscal stability and curtail new expenditure commitments.


• Other urgent priorities include:


• Targeted health reforms.


• Measures to tackle the unfolding municipal crisis, especially around water and sanitation.


• Innovative ways to tackle the jobs crisis.


• State reforms that strengthen the centre of government, professionalise the public service and ensure stronger accountability from public officials.

The fundamental reset and visioning

The minimum programme is a key precondition for stabilising the political centre in the short term, but it does not guarantee its sustainability. South Africa has growth and inequality constraints that our current growth model does not address. Both are linked. High inequality constrains growth, and low growth limits the scope for redistribution.

We must therefore put in place a new socioeconomic exchange that has at its centre a new black productive elite that creates wealth through productivity and innovation rather than rent-seeking.

This will require a policy reset. Both the parties that dominate the GNU have weak track records in this regard. The DA does not enjoy a close relationship with black business, being more closely associated with minority interests and the large corporate sector. The ANC’s power base, to quote Moeletsi Mbeki, is primarily a consumptive elite that has little interest in developing productive capacity or sustaining the institutions required to achieve this.

Read more: Moeletsi Mbeki: Big business, not the ANC, created BEE

We need a new productive elite that is vested in growth and in the stability of institutions. We need inclusive institutions that allow for innovation and adaptability, and which can mobilise people behind the shared benefits of common solutions.

This will require a rethink on industrial policy; fiscal policy; innovation and entrepreneurship; competition policy; skills and human capabilities; social policy; infrastructure provisioning; allocative decisions in Treasury; and our tax regime. It will also require a fundamental rethink of the state, and the role of the state vis-à-vis other social actors like the private sector and civil society.

Process considerations 

The fundamental reset requires a whole of society approach. It is about constructing a new socioeconomic exchange, with clear trade-offs. There are non-negotiables that must be respected.

Minimum growth levels must be adhered to while we restructure (preferably between 3%-5%), meaning (1) current growth reforms must be sustained/accelerated, and (2) redistributive policy must be growth and investment neutral.

There must also be greater efforts to protect democratic constitutionalism and ensure institutional stability. Insurgent political forces will resist the reform process and destabilise the political centre. They might also attempt to hijack this process.

In taking forward this agenda there are three distinct tasks to which we need to give greater substance.

• First, the process by which the parties to the GNU develop their minimum programme and manage their internal differences.


• Second, the corporatist relationship between the “social partners” – government, business and labour – needs to be refreshed.


• Third, embedding the new political centre in society requires a broad-based process that embraces popular participation and mobilisation. The GNU will not succeed if it is left to be an elite pact between political parties and their corporate partners. The goal of this third process should be to reactivate democratic participation. Perhaps this is an issue for this conference to discuss. What innovative, 21st-century process of democratic engagement and consensus-building can we create? This is essential if we are to build momentum behind a fresh and compelling vision for growth and change.

The GNU provides a moment of institutional breathing space to accelerate economic reforms that should be further deepened through a minimum programme. However, it remains highly fragile.

The question is whether the GNU is a vehicle to go somewhere or a destination. You might find that the various parties have different answers to this question.

For the rest of us, we cannot just go along for the ride until the vehicle breaks down and we are left stranded.

It would therefore be prudent to interrogate the objective reality and plan ahead rather than being lulled into a false sense of security. As Siya and Rachel showed this week, there is no such thing as happily ever after. DM