Anchor states benefit Africa’s Peace and Security Council, but their dominance raises concerns

The African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) was modelled on the United Nations Security Council, with both having 15 member states. But unlike the UN Security Council, which has five permanent members who wield veto powers, the PSC’s regional rotational membership, in theory, favours more equitable decision-making. 

However in practice, several countries have continuously served on the PSC, leading to perceptions that they are de facto permanent members. Nigeria has been on the council since its creation in 2004, while Cameroon, Djibouti, Egypt and Uganda have each served five terms. Under the regional representation model, countries can retain their seats as long as their regions permit them to do so.

Long-term membership enables continuity but also presents some challenges. Since certain states are increasingly seeking continuous council seats, it is worth weighing up the costs and benefits of a PSC in which regional “anchor states” serve long terms. 

Article 5 of the PSC Protocol says all 55 AU member states have “equal rights” to serve as council members, with article 5(1) promoting inclusion and equality. But in a seeming contradiction, article 5(2) spells out qualification criteria for members based largely on their capacity – effectively establishing exclusion conditions. 

Over the past two decades the PSC seems to have prioritised equal representation and rotation of members over countries’ capacity.

The outcome of the 12 February 2025 PSC elections revived the debate on the continuous membership of certain states. Institute for Security Studies’ sources confirm that due to its late application, the Central African Republic lost out on the region’s three-year seat to Cameroon, the sole applicant for central Africa. This effectively extended Cameroon’s membership, suggesting it was becoming the region’s equivalent of Nigeria – which has represented west Africa on the PSC for 20 years. 

The issue of dominant regional states also came up in the case of southern Africa. Despite a standing agreement that all regions submit one candidate based on alphabetic rotation, Eswatini and South Africa notified the PSC Secretariat and Office of the Legal Counsel of their interest in the three-year position – despite South Africa recently finishing its council term.

Although Eswatini was given the nod, South Africa still discussed the possibility of serving with regional counterparts, raising questions about whether equal rights to PSC representation should be revisited. 

South Africa’s bid for the three-year seat reflects its influence and contribution to regional and continental peace and security. The country was a major troop and finance contributor to the Southern African Development Community Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (SAMIDRC) and the SADC Mission in Mozambique. Its contribution to SAMIDRC alone was about 2,900 military personnel at a cost of R2.4-billion in 2024. 

The impact of that role on the country was not just financial. As security in eastern DRC deteriorated early this year, 14 South African soldiers were killed, leading to repeated calls from within the country for a withdrawal of troops. International Relations Minister Ronald Lamola countered that South Africa played an important role in maintaining peace and economic stability on the continent.

South Africa’s commitments suggest it is a regional hegemon capable of carrying out PSC responsibilities. Notwithstanding its status and appeal, the country respected the regional procedure and ceded to Eswatini.

Cameroon made an equally compelling case to secure its PSC seat until 2028. The country’s contribution of troops to the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in the Lake Chad Basin has been consistent since the force’s reactivation in 2014. 

At a time when Niger has suspended its participation in the MNJTF and Chad has threatened to withdraw, Nigeria and Cameroon’s continued resolve to combat Boko Haram confirms their commitment to peace and stability. The PSC decision in January 2025 to renew the MNJTF’s mandate for another year suggests that Cameroon’s presence on the council allows it to influence decision-making and implementation. 

While regional anchor states bring stability and continuity to the PSC, their dominance raises concerns, among them a potential conflict between national interests and regional stability. 

Nigeria and Cameroon, for example, are heavily involved in regional security operations, primarily in self-defence against threats such as Boko Haram. These efforts contribute to broader continental peace but also align with the two countries’ national priorities, which may inadvertently bias PSC decisions. Regional anchor states could also advocate for policies that serve their immediate needs rather than those of the continent.

Another concern is the disproportionate influence that long-serving states can exert on the council’s agenda. This may lead to anchor states steering the council away from addressing domestic crises within their own borders. 

For example, despite ongoing internal conflicts in Cameroon, the country has not been discussed meaningfully by the PSC since 2008, except with regard to cross-border migration. Similarly, Nigeria has faced major internal security challenges, including human rights abuses during the #EndSARS protests in 2020. However, PSC discussions have focused largely on the MNJTF rather than governance concerns within Nigeria.

The prolonged membership of regional anchor states could also create interstate tensions. Smaller or less-influential countries may feel excluded from PSC decision-making, which could damage regional cohesion. For instance, South Africa’s attempt to extend its term sparked informal wrangling over whether the southern Africa region should follow alphabetical rotation or favour member-state capacity and influence in peacekeeping efforts.

As the debate on whether certain states should be allowed a continued PSC presence gains impetus, a key consideration is whether countries have the capacity to contribute to Africa’s peace and security. 

As the AU prepares to review its African Peace and Security Architecture, an assessment of the PSC and particularly member states’ commitment to and capacity for peace operations and peacekeeping, should be prioritised. This will ensure that the PSC remains both representative and effective in fulfilling its mandate. DM

Maram Mahdi, Researcher, African Peace and Security Governance, Institute for Security Studies (ISS).

First published by ISS Today.