Was the SADC Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (SAMIDRC) a success, a failure or somewhere in between? The South African government claims the regional military force deployed to the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in December 2023 is only being withdrawn because peace talks are under way. It even suggests the mission was a success because it helped prompt peace talks. But most military experts dismiss this as retrospective political spin and say the SAMIDRC is in reality retreating from the DRC because of its deadly military defeats by M23 rebels backed by Rwanda. And they say it did not fulfil its mandate.
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) decided at a summit in Luanda on 17 August 2023 to establish a military force of brigade strength and to deploy it in the eastern DRC, mainly to “neutralise” the M23, an ethnic-Tutsi militia which had been terrorising the eastern DRC for well over a decade. M23 was supported by about 4,000 Rwandan troops with quite heavy and sophisticated equipment including anti-aircraft missiles, the United Nations testified.
SAMIDRC, comprising troops mainly from SA, but also Tanzania and Malawi, began deploying to the eastern DRC from 15 December 2023, initially for a year. It had some skirmishes with the M23 in 2024 in which some of its troops were killed and some injured.
In November 2024 SADC decided to extend SAMIDRC’s mission for another year because of its “concern at the continued deterioration of the security and humanitarian situation in the country”.
M23 continued to expand its footprint. At the end of January 2025, it launched a major attack on Goma, the capital of North Kivu province, clashing with SAMIDRC forces along the way, killing 14 South African, three Malawian and two Tanzanian soldiers as well as one Uruguayan soldier from the UN peacekeeping mission Monusco. M23 captured Goma and then Bukavu, capital of South Kivu, and other territory. The SAMIDRC forces were overrun and surrounded and neutralised, effectively becoming prisoners of war.
On 13 March this year, SADC leaders decided to terminate SAMIDRC’s mandate and on 29 April – after previously repatriating the dead and wounded – the main force began withdrawing from DRC, by road through Rwanda to Tanzania, escorted by Rwandan soldiers.
That looked very much like a retreat. And as the saying goes, if it walks like a duck…
Read more: Anatomy of SADC’s failure in eastern DRC and what it means for future regional operations
‘Not a sign of weakness’
But on Sunday, 4 May, Defence Minister Angie Motshekga and SA National Defence Force (SANDF) chief, General Rudzani Maphwanya, insisted at a briefing that the withdrawal was “not a sign of weakness” and that it could even be considered a success because it had prompted peace talks.
Motshekga said that over the past four months “extensive” diplomacy had “progressed with great momentum” and that had led to SADC’s decision of 13 March to terminate SAMIDRC’S mandate “to allow political and diplomatic interventions to resolve the security situation in the eastern DRC…”
This diplomacy included a peace agreement signed between DRC and the M23 movement brokered with support of SADC, the African Union and the East African Community.
Maphwanya said the withdrawal was not accidental and not “a sign of weakness”, but was part of the political effort to achieve peace and stability in the eastern DRC.
That peace and stability was “now on the horizon”, and with the ceasefire South Africa had decided “we cannot shoot our way through to peace, but let us allow mediation … to take the lead.”
Asked if he was saying SAMIDRC had been a success, he replied: “By implication, yes, indeed, we see SAMIDRC as having contributed to that effort to ensure that there is an inclusive engagement that eventually is leading towards peace.”
He also insisted that “our withdrawal is not abandoning the people of DRC” as South Africa would remain involved both through its troops deployed in the UN peacekeeping mission Monusco who would remain in DRC and its participation in mediation efforts.
‘The road to peace is a long one’
Most commentators remain unconvinced by these explanations, particularly the narrative that SAMIDRC withdrew because peace talks were under way.
Stephanie Wolters, senior research fellow and Great Lakes expert at the SA Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), told Daily Maverick: “The state of the peace talks is ongoing and there is more activity than there has been since the beginning of this conflict. There are the peace talks in Doha, between the DRC and M23. And then there’s the ongoing discussions between Rwanda and the DRC through Washington .
Read more: DRC debacle batters SA’s standing as an actor in African peacekeeping
“And I think one can be cautiously positive about those making some kind of progress in the near future. But it would be wrong to say that SAMIDRC pulled out because there was a ceasefire or because the conditions on the ground have changed significantly, because they haven’t – and the road to peace remains a very long one, especially for civilians living in the eastern DRC. Nothing on the ground bears that out. Certainly nothing SAMIDRC contributed to unfortunately.
“SAMIDRC pulled out because they were attacked by the M23 on its way to Goma, and because they took heavy losses and appear to have concluded that further engagement could be very dangerous. And they wanted to get out of there as soon as possible. And we have seen how the Rwandans escorted them across the border through their territory to Tanzania.”
Dean Wingrin, a defence analyst for Defenceweb, this week analysed SAMIDRC’s performance against its mandate, point by point, in posts on X.
Also, in response to Motshekga and Maphwanya’s claims that SAMIDRC was withdrawn in response to progress in peace talks, he noted: “A tentative ceasefire [between the DRC and M23] was only brokered from 23 April, thanks to US/Qatar intervention. This is way after the decision [on 13 March] to withdraw SAMIDRC.”
“At the time the SADC terminated the SAMIDRC mission, there were no direct talks yet between the DRC and rebel groups, nor any ceasefire.”.
And he pointed out that SADC leaders had also implicitly acknowledged this in their summit of 13 March because, in terminating SAMIDRC’s mandate, they had noted “the continued deterioration of the security situation in the eastern DRC, including the capturing of Goma and Bukavu, and the blockage of the main supply routes, making it difficult for humanitarian aid to flow”.
Mission accomplished?
SAMIDRC’s mandate was signed in December 2023 by Zambian President Hakainde Hichilema, as chairperson of SADC’s security organ. Its first aim, point A, was to “ support the Democratic Republic of Congo to neutralise negative forces and armed groups in the eastern DRC in order to restore and maintain peace and security to create a secure environment”. The target was clearly the M23 .
Instead of neutralising M23 and creating peace and security, though, “the overall strategic environment in eastern DRC worsened. M23 cemented control over major towns, the FARDC [the DRC’s defence force] remained hamstrung, humanitarian suffering spiked, and civilians and infrastructure stayed at grave risk”, Wingrin noted.
Point B of the mandate was to “support FARDC by providing logistic, land, air and maritime assistance in order to enhance its military operational capabilities”.
However, Wingrin said: “FARDC remained reliant on SAMIDRC support without showing marked improvements. Post-Goma reports indicate ongoing operational struggles against rebels.”
Point C of the mandate was “to provide support to the efforts of the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo to continue creating a conducive environment for humanitarian assistance and providing humanitarian relief to the population affected by the military and paramilitary activities in the eastern DRC, including the internally displaced persons”.
Instead, as Wingrin noted, there were “reports of hundreds of civilians killed and 500,000 displaced in just two months leading up to withdrawal, exacerbating an already dire crisis. By May 2025, humanitarian access in captured areas remains constrained.”
Point D of the mandate was to “protect critical infrastructure in the eastern DRC”. Instead, Wingrin said, “heavy fighting around Sake, Minova and Goma damaged airports, roads, bridges and health facilities. Coordination between SAMIDRC and Monusco was weak, leaving infrastructure projects exposed to rebel attacks.”
Point E of the mandate was to “protect civilians and their properties under imminent threat of attacks”.
The reality on the ground was “reports of hundreds of rapes, looting and attacks on displaced civilians, even in SAMIDRC’s areas of ops”, said Wingrin. “Total civilian toll climbed into the thousands killed by early 2025. Civilian deaths and human rights abuses persisted despite the mission’s presence.”
Many reasons have been offered for SAMIDRC’s failure, including the lack of a political vision to contextualise military intervention – that is only now happening post facto. Its commanders also made poor tactical decisions, some experts said, such as locating their bases below hills from which M23 bombarded them with mortars.
But, as Wingrin and other experts have pointed out, the main problem with SAMIDRC was that it was simply outnumbered and outgunned by the M23, plus the Rwandan Defence Force.
The mandate had called for: “Brigade (+) force with critical maritime, air and artillery support capabilities, logistical support (road transport capabilities, repair and recovery capabilities, casualties/medical evacuation (CASEVAC/MEDEVAC)), intelligence acquisition means and Quick Reaction Force in support of the DRC.”
“The force was to be approximately 5,000 in size, with SA providing a max of 2,900 troops, the balance of 5,000 from Malawi and Tanzania,” Wingrin said.
“It appears that SA provided far less soldiers (it still declines to say how many) and Tanzania sent a limited contingent of about 400 TPDF soldiers. Malawi sent troops. No air support capabilities were provided.”
“These shortfalls hampered SAMIDRC’s ability to neutralise armed groups, enhance FARDC effectiveness, deliver humanitarian relief and protect civilians and infrastructure.”
M23’s territorial gains, rising civilian suffering, and persistent instability in eastern DRC meant that “the SAMIDRC mission did not fulfil its mandate to restore peace, prevent loss of life and stabilise eastern DRC. Consequently, it cannot be considered a success.” DM