DRC’s M23 conflict — Rwanda’s heightened role underscores regional tensions, mineral exploitation, brutal human cost

2 Feb 2025

The M23 rebels, allegedly backed by Rwanda, continue their offensive in North Kivu, escalating tensions and destabilising the region.

The deployment of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) in North Kivu province in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as part of the Southern African Development Community Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC) is not the first time South Africa’s military has confronted the Rwanda-backed M23 rebels. Yet the stakes today are exponentially higher as the conflict threatens to destabilise the entire Great Lakes region.

M23 – named after the defunct 23 March 2009 peace agreement that its founders accused Kinshasa of violating – re-emerged in late 2021 after nearly a decade of dormancy. The group, predominantly composed of Congolese Tutsis, has long been accused of receiving covert support from Rwanda, in response to Kinshasa’s alleged harbouring of Hutu genocidaires linked to the 1994 Rwandan genocide.

Marisa Lourenço, an independent risk analyst, underscored the inevitability of conflict in this resource-rich region when speaking to Daily Maverick: “The area around Goma has been in a state of conflict for decades, and this is unlikely to change, especially considering what is at stake: access to minerals that are in huge demand across the globe.

“No rebel group is going to give up attempts to access this, especially when there is so much to gain, like access to land, power and the possibility of nationhood for groups within the Great Lakes region displaced decades ago.”

Although sanctions would bolster the DRC’s political profile in the Great Lakes, they are unlikely to cripple Rwanda’s influence.

South Africa’s initial involvement in the conflict dates to 2013, when SANDF troops joined the UN’s Force Intervention Brigade to quash M23’s first uprising. The operation succeeded temporarily, but the rebels regrouped with enhanced tactics and weaponry.

By 2023, M23 had seized key mining towns such as Rubaya, a major coltan hub, crippling Kinshasa’s revenue streams and emboldening their territorial ambitions.

Criticism of the SANDF’s SAMIDRC deployment has focused on logistical shortfalls. Military analysts and SANDF insiders, speaking anonymously, have highlighted chronic shortages of ammunition, air support and functional armoured vehicles. “We’re fighting a 21st-century war with 20th-century tools,” one officer told The EastAfrican in January, as M23 closed in on Goma, the capital of North Kivu province.

These concerns were starkly validated during the 24 to 25 January clashes near Sake, where SANDF casualties mounted amid heavy artillery fire.

The rebels’ advance coincides with a critical juncture in international diplomacy. As M23 consolidates territorial gains, Kinshasa is racing to rally global allies ahead of the UN Security Council session in March, where Kinshasa will push for sanctions against Rwanda and increased peacekeeping support. Analysts speculate that M23’s offensive aims to seize Goma before the session, thereby weakening Rwanda’s geopolitical leverage.

Read more: SADC leaders likely to withdraw forces from DRC, including SANDF

Lourenço cautions that although sanctions “would bolster the DRC’s political profile in the Great Lakes, strengthening [DRC President Félix] Tshisekedi’s influence within the subregion and the AU more broadly”, they are unlikely to cripple Rwanda’s influence.

She notes that Rwandan President Paul Kagame’s regime, though likely facing reputational damage in Western circles, has mitigated risks by cultivating economic ties with Middle Eastern states, which prioritise investment over political intervention. Sanctions may bolster Tshisekedi’s regional clout but fail to destabilise Rwanda’s entrenched geopolitical position.

Battle for Goma

Reports from social media and SANDF insiders, noted by defence analysts as early as 22 January, indicated that M23 rebels had begun advancing towards Goma. Videos showed columns of fighters equipped with modernised FAST-style helmets and pixellated woodland camouflage patterns identical to those used by the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF). Geolocated footage from Sake and Minova, analysed by the Congo Research Group, reinforced UN allegations of Kigali’s material backing.

“The allegations of Rwandan support for M23 are all but confirmed,” Lourenço states. “The UN reported on this as far back as 2013, and has become more vocal on the matter since 2022… There is also documented photographic evidence of RDF soldiers fighting alongside M23 rebels.”

Today, the DRC’s vast mineral reserves – essential to the global green energy transition – remain both a curse and a prize.

Footage alleged to be from the recent conflict between the SANDF and M23 shows South African forces firing heavy machine guns and an anti-aircraft weapon, geolocated by Daily Maverick to their base outside Sake during combat.

The DRC, which has long held that Kigali is the covert hand behind M23’s conduct, escalated its rhetoric. At a press conference on 25 January, military spokesperson General Sylvain Epenge said: “What Rwanda does not know is that the war has not yet begun… and it will begin.”

The death of North Kivu governor Major General Peter Cirimwami – a key M23 target – on 23 January marked a turning point, triggering Tshisekedi’s emergency return from Davos and an urgent meeting with top defence officials.

A history of violence

South Africa and the DRC have been historically intertwined since the latter’s independence from Belgium in 1960.

The DRC, then Zaire, emerged under Patrice Lumumba, a socialist pan-Africanist whose vision of sovereignty clashed with Cold War geopolitics. Lumumba’s 1961 assassination, orchestrated with CIA and Belgian involvement, installed the Western-backed dictator Mobutu Sese Seko, whose 32-year kleptocratic reign drained the country’s resources.

Mobutu’s downfall in 1997 was precipitated by his harbouring of Hutu extremists who had fled Rwanda after the 1994 genocide. Rwanda’s Kagame, then a rebel commander, supported the coalition that ousted Mobutu, sparking the First Congo War, which drew in regional armies and ignited proxy battles over land and ethnicity.

South Africa’s post-apartheid government, under Nelson Mandela, maintained a policy of non-interference towards Mobutu, despite his atrocities. Mandela privately condemned the regime but prioritised regional stability, a stance that shifted in the 2000s as South African corporations such as MTN and Standard Bank expanded into the DRC’s mineral-rich east. This economic entanglement, however, coincided with the eruption of the M23 rebellion in 2012, drawing Pretoria into a conflict mirroring Cold War-era fractures.

Today, the DRC’s vast mineral reserves – essential to the global green energy transition – remain both a curse and a prize. M23’s resurgence underscores the unresolved tensions between regional powers, resource exploitation and the human cost of perpetual conflict.

Lourenço offers a bleak prognosis: “Minerals are a lucrative business, and so is war. In the eastern DRC, both are present, and therein lies the barrier towards any possibility for sustainable peace in the region. Policy responses are limited, because Kinshasa has limited control over the eastern parts of the country.”

Friction between President Cyril Ramaphosa and Kagame soared after the latter accused Pretoria of misleading statements. With SAMIDRC under scrutiny, analysts warn that, absent diplomacy, South Africa’s role in the conflict may only prolong the brutality. DM

This story first appeared in our weekly Daily Maverick 168 newspaper, which is available countrywide for R35.

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Africa

Battle for Goma

A history of violence