Erosion of consensus-based governance will have profound impact on multilateral negotiations

16 Apr 2025

The end of consensus is not merely a reflection of changing geopolitical dynamics – it represents a fundamental shift in the mechanisms of international cooperation.

This is the second of a four-part OP-ED series led by the Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance at the University of Cape Town, providing insights on the key themes being discussed by the world’s major economies in more than 140 major official meetings until the G20 Summit in November 2025. Read Part 1 here.

The 1990s were a pivotal decade for multilateralism, marked by a series of United Nations conferences that solidified a new approach to global governance. These gatherings, addressing themes such as development, human rights, gender equality and social inclusion, fostered a consensus-driven framework, distinct from the more contentious economic policies championed by institutions like the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The World Summit for Social Development held in Copenhagen in 1995, for instance, pioneered a more conciliatory and inclusive methodology that sought to integrate economic and social priorities. Other key conferences, such as the Beijing Conference on Women (1995) and the Kyoto Protocol negotiations on climate change (1997), reinforced this approach.

Meanwhile, in stark contrast, the WTO was embroiled in increasing controversy, particularly during the 1999 Seattle Ministerial Conference, which saw large-scale protests against globalisation and trade liberalisation policies that many perceived as favouring corporate interests over social welfare.

At the same time, the IMF, guided by the sacrosanct principles of the Washington Consensus, imposed a series of ultra-liberal macroeconomic policies across developing countries, often leading to severe social consequences, including austerity measures that exacerbated inequality and economic instability.

While the UN conferences and the Millennium Development Goals sought to build a broader global consensus on social progress, the economic governance of globalisation remained largely exclusionary and contentious, highlighting the widening divide between cooperative multilateral efforts and neoliberal economic orthodoxy.

What was once the exclusive domain of diplomatic negotiations has gradually been overtaken by an array of think tanks, lobbying groups and activists championing single causes.

As global challenges evolved, the consensus-building mechanisms established in the 1990s extended to new domains, including climate action and public health crises. The climate negotiations, for instance, relied on the painstakingly crafted language of agreements and declarations, with victory often being declared when even the most tenuous consensus in wording was achieved.

The Covid-19 pandemic further demonstrated the extent to which multilateral cooperation relied on broad but fragile agreements, with global health measures, vaccine distribution and economic relief plans all requiring meticulous diplomatic negotiation.

This methodology of consensus-building, however, has faced increasing strain due to the proliferation of actors involved in global governance. What was once the exclusive domain of diplomatic negotiations has gradually been overtaken by an array of think tanks, lobbying groups and activists championing single causes.

This shift culminated at COP28 in Dubai, where nearly 500,000 participants, including a record number of heads of state, engaged in discussions and negotiations that ultimately produced yet another series of compromises echoing previous ambitions. Despite the scale and scope of these gatherings, they have increasingly become platforms where the appearance of consensus is achieved rather than substantive, enforceable commitments.

Enter the G20

In this evolving landscape, ever since its revalidation in the aftermath of the 2008-09 financial crisis, the G20 has emerged as a crucial institution, often regarded as the ultimate arbiter of what various multilateral platforms present as consensus. The G20’s influence has grown to the point where nearly 300 meetings take place annually under each rotating presidency.

If the primary beneficiary of globalisation rules – the US – loses interest in maintaining universal processes, the existing methodologies of global governance become untenable.

Despite this extensive engagement, real decision-making power remains concentrated in the hands of finance ministers and their sherpas, who serve as the gatekeepers of economic governance priorities. This hierarchical structure ensures that, without the endorsement of these key figures, broader discussions on multilateralism struggle to gain traction.

The policies and attitudes of the US towards multilateralism have historically shaped the global order, and the shifts introduced by the current US administration warrant close scrutiny. The multilateral architecture has long been dominated by American models and priorities, with other influential players continuously testing the boundaries of their influence. However, if the primary beneficiary of globalisation rules – the US – loses interest in maintaining universal processes, the existing methodologies of global governance become untenable.

The end of consensus, in this context, signals not only a systemic transformation but also the collapse of a long-standing hypocrisy: the pretence that global agreements were truly binding when, in reality, they often served as little more than a diplomatic facade.

The future of multilateralism is likely to hinge on a new approach centred on coalitions of the willing.

The dissonance between agreed commitments and actual implementation is perhaps most evident in climate action. Despite decades of negotiations, the failure to adhere to even modest climate targets has set the stage for catastrophic planetary consequences.

The erosion of consensus-based governance is poised to have a profound impact on the methodologies traditionally employed in multilateral negotiations. The first casualty of this shift is already apparent within the G20, where the inability to reach agreement on language and objectives marks the beginning of a new era. Without the veil of consensus, multilateral forums are likely to become arenas of open discord, where underlying tensions and competing interests are no longer suppressed by carefully worded compromises.

The implications of this transformation extend beyond high-level diplomacy. As consensus erodes, fundamental concepts that were once considered sacrosanct – such as stability, or diversity, inclusion and equality – are increasingly being challenged. The contestation of these principles reflects broader ideological divisions that have permeated global governance, further complicating efforts to establish common ground. The absence of an agreed-upon framework for engagement threatens to dismantle the cooperative structures that have underpinned international relations for the past three decades.

Given these realities, the future of multilateralism is likely to hinge on a new approach centred on coalitions of the willing. Instead of striving for unattainable universal consensus, international cooperation may need to shift towards partnerships among states and entities that share common values and objectives.

This model, emphasising pragmatism over rhetoric, could offer a more sustainable path forward for global governance. The focus should be on working with those who remain committed to multilateralism, ensuring that progress is driven by aligned interests rather than diluted by forced compromises.

Ultimately, the end of consensus is not merely a reflection of changing geopolitical dynamics – it represents a fundamental shift in the mechanisms of international cooperation. As traditional methodologies become increasingly unviable, the challenge will be to build new frameworks that can effectively address global issues without relying on the illusion of universal agreement. Whether this transition leads to more effective governance or greater fragmentation remains to be seen, but what is certain is that the era of consensus-driven multilateralism has reached its breaking point. DM

Carlos Lopes is a professor at the Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance, University of Cape Town, and former executive secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa. He is also a member of the UN Committee for Development Policy.

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