Dailymaverick logo

Maverick News

Maverick News

Silence of the Lambs — Identity of apartheid state informers buried along with former ‘superspy’ Niël Barnard

Silence of the Lambs — Identity of apartheid state informers buried along with former ‘superspy’ Niël Barnard
PW Botha, former president of South Africa, during the apartheid years. (Photo: Gallo Images / Media 24)
Lukas Daniel ‘Niël’ Barnard believed that successful intelligence agents needed to master the art of acting and operating inconspicuously, relying on ‘little else but their ideological convictions’. 

Niël Barnard, former head of the National Intelligence Service (NIS), died on 13 January, aged 76, taking with him to the great beyond the names of prominent South Africans who once collaborated with the apartheid state.

Barnard, who retired to Gansbaai and battled cancer for some time, was the “backroom” man who had the ear of the last two apartheid presidents, PW Botha and later, FW de Klerk, with regard to a negotiated settlement with the then-banned African National Congress (ANC) and its leaders.

Born in South West Africa (now Namibia), Barnard is guaranteed a place in the annals of South Africa’s democratic history, alongside others who helped shape a non-racial, democratic future.

However, it is worth noting that in 1985, then ANC president Oliver Tambo set up a seven-person constitutional committee including Pallo Jordan, Kader Asmal, Albie Sachs, Jack Simon and Zola Skweyiya, to create the backbone for a future constitution. 

The team drafted 14 versions before producing a document endorsed in 1988 by the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity as the basis of the approach to South Africa.

While Barnard had acted as a bridge and a repository of vital intelligence and information for Botha and his cabinet during “secret” talks with the incarcerated Nelson Mandela in preparation for the negotiations, the process within the ANC had already begun and it was already a few steps ahead.

In “Dear Comrade President”, historian Andre Odendaal’s enlightening tome about the pre-planning within the ANC in exile, he writes that a later feature of the negotiating process was “the way in which the ANC, with its more than four years of focused pre-planning, outmanoeuvred opponents determined to block democracy”. 

Backed into a corner

In the late 1980s the Nationalist government, backed into a corner as a result of years-long sanctions as well as internal and external political pressure coupled with shifting global relations, had no choice but to settle.

Barnard found himself in the eye of the storm, as a new and democratic South Africa was born and turbulently took shape.

The collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 enabled Nationalists to uncouple themselves from the notion of the rooi gevaar or the “communist” bogeyman, deployed with tremendous success to fan fear among the minority white population for 48 years.

“The list” of alleged collaborators, as it has become known, contained, according to Barnard himself in a 27-page affidavit to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in 1997, the names of several individuals “who today occupied prominent leadership positions in South Africa” and who had supplied “security information” to the NIS.

These informers were embedded in politics, administrative positions, public life, the business and media sectors and other spheres, he said. Some had supplied the information knowingly and others unknowingly at times, he admitted.

Mandela’s request

In 1997, the newly elected first president of democratic South Africa, Nelson Mandela, called on Barnard to submit the list to the TRC.

“It is expected of all people who once occupied positions of responsibility and command, irrespective of political background, that they shall make a full disclosure to the TRC,” said a statement issued by Mandela's office.

Mandela added that “not only does this have the potential to undermine the confidence of the people, it brings about the possibility of undermining the strides we have made in promoting reconciliation”.

after the bell Nelson Mandela speaks during a press conference at the Swedish parliament in Stockholm on 13 March 1990, while on a five-day state visit to the country. (Photo: Per-Anders Pettersson / Getty Images)



Barnard had been subpoenaed by the commission to answer questions especially with regard to the violent conflict in KwaZulu-Natal. 

In his affidavit, Barnard claimed that considering “the extremely delicate political, administrative and socio-economic social transformation phase in which South Africa found itself at present, it would, in my considered judgement, be an absolute tragedy if such individuals were identified at his stage”.

Dene Smuts, member of the then Democratic Party, said that while the ANC had insisted on the disclosure of NIS informants, “the party had yet to make public the names of top ANC informers which had been given to President Nelson Mandela by Mike Louw, formerly of the NIS”.

It was these ANC office bearers, she said, “whose complicity, conscious or unconscious, should be cleared or confirmed because they now run the country – however painful it is to deal with alleged betrayals”.

Barnard was part of the Nationalist inner circle and as such was implicated in having been present when decisions were taken by the powerful State Security Council (SSC) to extrajudicially eliminate perceived “enemies of the state”.

The man at the back

As Daily Maverick colleague Marianne Merten noted in 2001 during Barnard’s later stint as director-general of the Western Cape, he rarely made headlines back then.

Lukas Daniel “Niël” Barnard believed that successful intelligence agents needed to master the art of acting and operating inconspicuously, relying on “little else but their ideological convictions”. 

This he revealed in a CR Swart lecture in 1983 at his alma mater, the University of the Orange Free State.

Born in Otjiwarongo in 1949, Barnard served in the local Commandos militia and as a captain in the Citizen Force (reserve) before graduating from the University of the Orange Free State with a politics and history PhD in 1975. By 1978 he had become an assistant professor in political science.

He was appointed to head the newly established NIS by President Botha himself. The two men enjoyed a close relationship. 

Of the first meeting between Botha and Mandela, Barnard told journalist John Carlin: “I was ... I believe ... jittery or something like that, to a certain extent. 

“Because I know Mr Botha quite well. I still believe him to be a very, very competent man, but he had a quick temper ... Mr. Mandela himself is a man of a considerable personality and can you imagine if they kicked off shouting and arguing. 

“It would have been extremely stupid. So yes, I tried on both sides to prepare them in such way. [To Mandela], ‘Understand that Mr Botha has a quick temper. Don’t fight it out now. In any event, you two will not solve the fighting in any way whatsoever. Do it just to come to learn each other’, and so on".

PW Botha, former president of South Africa, during the apartheid years. (Photo: Gallo Images / Media 24)



Mandela, he opined, knew how to deploy his disarming charm but was “tough as nails, make no mistake about it, and he can, like all human beings, sometimes be very unreasonable”. 

“When he firmly believes in something, he believes in that and it’s extremely difficult to change his mindset on certain matters”.

Out in the spotlight 

Barnard made it to the news in 1996 when he was ousted with a multimillion-rand payout, partly his 22-year civil service pension and the remainder of his contract after the National Party withdrew from the then government of national unity.

His appearance at the TRC in 1997 drew widespread interest and he was questioned about his role as the head of NIS and chair of the government’s coordinating intelligence committee.

In its 1998 interim report, the commission noted that it “rejects the standpoint of former NIS director-general Niël Barnard and other former NIS operatives who have denied involvement and/or knowledge that intelligence gathered was put to operation uses that included elimination. The commission finds his viewpoint that the manner in which intelligence supplied by his agency was used against opponents.”

In his 2014 book, Askari, celebrated South African author Jacob Dlamini excavated the meaning and the aftermath of betrayal and collaboration by apartheid spies and intelligence agencies.

Read more: Betrayal chronicles: The agonising case of Apartheid’s black collaborators

Dlamini highlighted that in 1993, the NIS destroyed 44 tons of files, microfilm, tapes and computer disks. 

Barnard had been a key member of the SSC and had sat in on key decisions by the securocrat elite, such as a meeting on 19 March 1984 at which the “removal” of activists Matthew Goniwe and Fort Calata (murdered the following June) was decided. 

He was also at the 13 February 1986 meeting of the SSC working group that agreed on establishing a clandestine “Third Force” to combat opponents. Secret minutes showed Barnard argued against the majority who had called for the establishment of a paramilitary force to buttress Inkatha, highlighting the “political risks”.

He later explained at his TRC amnesty hearing that such a unit “would lead to a further increase of the military conflict in Natal and the result would be more loss of lives”.

He said he was only able to extract “a compromise that the unit’s operations had to be cleared at the highest level”. Operation Marion was set up to train 200 Inkatha members in the Caprivi Strip and would later turn out to be responsible for the 1987 KwaMakhutha Massacre, among other atrocities.

Niël Barnard was a man who found himself at the right place, at the right time among the right leaders having lived a life in service to his profession. 

That the names of those who offered information to the state now are locked behind his lifeless lips is evidence of this. DM

Categories: