Glebelands, Part Two: ‘They are making money from our blood. The Public Protector must do her job’

This is the second of a two-part series exposing administrative failure and alleged corruption at one of South Africa’s most violent social housing complexes, how it came about and why it probably won’t be addressed any time soon. (Read Part One: Durban’s hostel dwellers the collateral damage as Public Protector fights battles on all fronts.)

***

Since March 2014, violence from Glebelands has seeped across the province. Police are still rounding up hostel hitmen, some of whom – after seemingly enjoying years of political protection – have since been charged or convicted for taxi and political killings and other priority crimes across KZN. As a result of the chaos, hundreds of lives have been ruined, thousands continue to live in desperate squalor, and conditions leading to the meltdown remain unaddressed.

After the arrest of a Glebelands rogue policeman in late 2017, the violence abated considerably. But this is merely a ceasefire – a holding pattern until systemic problems are properly dealt with. Given the scale of the crisis, its impact on the rights of many vulnerable groups and potential to cause further even greater societal havoc, one would have thought that getting it right at Glebelands would be a priority for the PP. But it seems not.

With astonishing and uncharacteristic haste the PP recently concluded contentious investigations involving Public Enterprises Minister Pravin Gordhan and President Cyril Ramaphosa. The flurry of investigations into Gordhan – none of which contain new or untested allegations – began in late 2018 and took less than a year to complete. The complaint against Ramaphosa, lodged by the DA in November 2018, has been similarly concluded at breakneck speed.

Compare this to the PP’s intervention at Glebelands, where, despite considerable loss of life, she has exhibited no similar sense of urgency.

Allocation anarchy

When the eThekwini Municipality took over hostel administration in the early 2000s, Glebelands residents said they began noticing an ever-widening disparity between vast budgets allocated for upgrades, declining maintenance and the constantly dismal reality on the ground.

Political sources later claimed the ruling party viewed hostel tenders as “cash cows” from which funds could be milked with impunity. Hostel contracts, the jobs flowing from them and the allocation of accommodation quickly became vehicles of patronage and a means of entrenching political support.

Motheo Construction is among the politically connected companies that won lucrative contracts at Glebelands. (Photo: supplied)

The allocation of rooms, particularly in blocks constructed during phases 1, 2 and 3 of Glebelands redevelopment (2006 to 2015) has been highly contentious. Community leaders alleged that relatively affluent people “from other areas” were given the new family units while those squashed into grossly overcrowded rooms were neglected. According to the municipality’s website, to qualify for hostel accommodation combined household earnings should be between R1,500 and R3,500 per month.

The following questions were directed to the PP:

• 
  

  Who was allocated rooms in these blocks?

  
  


• 
  

  Did these tenants qualify as social housing beneficiaries in terms of the municipality’s criteria?

  
  


• 
  

  Did any politicians or government officials benefit in any undue way from the allocation of these units (there were rumours the ward councillor was selling rooms or giving them only to his supporters)?

  
  


• 
  

  Do any of these tenants live elsewhere and derive income from sub-letting while paying little or no rent?

  
  

We also asked the PP to investigate whether correct procedure had been followed in the allocation of rooms to two suspects in the “Glebelands Eight” case – a Durban Central SAPS detective and a Prasa employee – charged with six other residents on multiple counts of murder, attempted murder, conspiracy to commit murder, extortion and racketeering.

According to their affidavits which were read out in court during their bail applications, their monthly incomes were around R16,000 and R18,000 while the combined value of just their vehicle assets totalled more than R400,000. How did these individuals qualify for social housing when the municipality turned away needy women with babies, some of whom who had been petrol- bombed from their rooms?

Deconstruction

The PP was also requested to probe Glebelands Phase 1, 2 and 3 tenders, particularly construction contracts awarded to DKS Holdings and the Motheo Construction Group. Media reports indicated that in 2005 to 2006, DKS Holdings was irregularly awarded an R18-million tender for Glebelands upgrades. Construction defects were so serious that the contract was terminated and remedial work assigned to another contractor at an additional cost of R14.2-million. However, DKS had already been paid R15.3-million and took the municipality to court to challenge the cancellation of the contract. Although the court ruled in the municipality’s favour and awarded costs against DKS, it later emerged that the company was paid a further R2.4-million after the company made representations to the former mayor and public accounts department.

The DA, which claimed it had reported the DKS matter to the Public Protector, also requested a wider probe into the abuse of tenders awarded under Section 36 of supply chain management regulations. In the municipality’s 2013-14 financial report – the year the violence began at Glebelands – 27% of all contracts were awarded in terms of Section 36, amounting to R1.722-billion. Many of these were for grass cutting and cleaning services in municipal buildings including hostels.

Cleaning services and grass cutting contracts are regularly awarded under Section 26 of the supply chain management regulations which allows contracts to be awarded without the usual tender procedures, as in an emergency. (Photo: supplied)

Grass cutting contracts are regularly awarded under Section 26 of the supply chain management regulations. (Photo: supplied)

The private security debacle

In 2013, the office of Glebelands Ward 76 councillor Robert Mzobe was burned down during community protests. In January 2014, the media reported that the municipality had consequently provided Mzobe with personal security costing R230,000 per month – the most expensive private security detail for any official of that level in South Africa.

Intelligence sources claimed Mzobe was assigned four bodyguards and two bulletproof vehicles on a 24/7 basis. Residents reported Mzobe’s bodyguards drive top-of-the-range SUVs. Additionally, a Public Order Policing (POP) unit vehicle – usually a Casspir – appears to be permanently stationed at Mzobe’s office. When he visits the hostel, Mzobe is reportedly provided with a police escort as well as vehicles from the private security company Secureco Metsu.

In 2016, media reports indicated that the municipality paid R45.6-million (R3.8-million per month) for the protection of 26 councillors of which Mzobe’s security is estimated to comprise at least R3-million. This money would be better spent on job creation programmes and addressing the broader issues afflicting the community – the appalling living conditions and social decay that are widely regarded as major drivers of violence in poor communities.

Since late 2017, Glebelands has experienced a 60% reduction in violence. Have new threat analyses been undertaken to ascertain if this excessive and expensive security detail is still warranted? Were proper procurement processes followed and did anyone receive undue benefit from these contracts? The duplication of services would also appear to constitute wasteful expenditure.

Over the years, investigative reporters have uncovered major irregularities involving the eThekwini Municipality’s private security suppliers – a number of which are owned by or connected to powerful political elites and also subject to ongoing litigation. Among these is Secureco Metsu, the private security company appointed in mid-2015 ostensibly to beef up security at Glebelands. It is unknown how much the Secureco contract costs Durban ratepayers or why Secureco and Fidelity (its parent company) vehicles were witnessed at Glebelands on an almost daily basis more than a year before the contract was announced.

Private security company Secureco Metsu on static deployment at Block O, Glebelands. (Photo: supplied)

The municipality has also failed to monitor Secureco’s performance at Glebelands. Community members report that Secureco staff are regularly seen drunk or drinking on duty, sleeping in their vehicles while parked under trees and allegedly fraternising with criminal elements.

It was later discovered that the Glebelands ANC Youth League (ANCYL) chairperson was resident at Block O while other ANCYL members lived at Block 57, one of whom was later found to be a Secureco employee (although not deployed at the hostel) who has since been charged under common purpose with seven other alleged hitmen in the “Glebelands Eight” case on nine counts of murder, six counts of attempted murder, conspiracy to commit murder, extortion and several other unrelated matters. While wanted by the police in early 2018, this suspect was said to have been nominated to become Glebelands’ next ANCYL chairperson.

Another Secureco staff member who was resident at Block 52 while simultaneously employed to undertake armed patrol duties at the hostel, was charged with the 2017 murder of a Glebelands woman. A key witness was assassinated a week after the woman’s murder. The Secureco member was acquitted under highly suspicious circumstances and the magistrate is now under investigation.

Security measures versus community safety

There was no consultation with the community, who said the money would have been better spent on urgently needed maintenance, repairs and infrastructure upgrades. The fence can be easily scaled and is already breached in many places including sections that blew down in an October 2017 storm. As with the deployment of private security, there was no reduction in violence after the mid-2016 erection of the fence, but again the opposite. At least 15 murders and attempted murders have taken place at or very near to Glebelands’ entrances – known hot spots – where biometric access control is scheduled to be installed.

Residents have raised concerns that not only will access control render them soft targets at known hot spots, but it will also endanger the lives of security guards deployed on gate duty. The PP was requested to investigate if the efficacy of these contracts justified their excessive expenditure and if the money would not have been better spent getting the basics right.

Our (un)caring City

A severe storm in October 2017 caused major damage at Glebelands. About 30 roofs were ripped off, guttering, drainage pipes and windows were smashed, infrastructure was damaged and the foundations of some buildings were undermined. Many rooms – particularly those on the top floors – were flooded, belongings were damaged or destroyed and some residents were forced to seek shelter in already overcrowded rooms in other parts of the hostel. Parts of KZN, including Umlazi, were declared disaster zones and the municipality, via the province, appealed to National Treasury for funds to repair storm-damaged infrastructure.

Above and below: damage during an October 2017 storm tore the roofs off about 30 blocks at Glebelands. (Photo: supplied)

In February 2018, Human Settlements MEC Ravi Pillay told the late Paddy Kearney (who had been assisting traumatised members of Glebelands community) that funds released by national government would be channelled via province to the municipality to be spent as needed. Queries regarding funds for Glebelands sent by a reporter to provincial treasury were referred to National Treasury, which failed to respond.

Extensive wash-aways exposed underground infrastructure during the October 2017 storm which has still not been repaired. (Photo: supplied)

Flooding during the October 2017 storm undermined the foundations of Block Q. This has still not been repaired, rendering the building unsafe for residents. (Photo: supplied)

Some residents tried to fix their own roof after the municipality took more than a year to approve a contractor to undertake urgently needed storm damage repairs. (Photo: supplied)

Roof repairs were eventually undertaken more than a year after the October 2017 storm. (Photo: supplied)

By early 2019, work on the roofs was mysteriously halted. Residents who approached the hostel superintendent were allegedly told that the municipality had not paid the contractor and it was not known when repairs would resume.

Although by that time most of the damaged roofs had been replaced, the community reported that guttering had not been installed so water poured down the stairs inside buildings whenever it rained.

Work recommenced after Malunga met the mayor and other officials in March 2019. Although Makhathini has since completed Glebelands’ roof repairs, there is no indication when, or even if, other storm damage will be repaired, or whether basic infrastructure such as water and electricity systems will be upgraded as per the PP’s 2017 recommendations.

Glebelands’ missing millions

In or around January/February 2018, members of the community alleged that a company – MWC Global (actually MWC Project Controls) – had been awarded a R75-million contract to undertake work at Glebelands. It was assumed (incorrectly it seems) that this was for storm damage repairs and that the R75-million was from National Treasury.

According to community sources, at some stage between late 2017 and early 2018, MWC advertised jobs. Applicants would apparently receive two weeks’ training in terms of whatever work was to be undertaken with respect to the R75-million contract. However, no one could establish where or even if the training actually took place, what the selection criteria were for applicants, who did the training, what the training consisted of or how the positions were advertised. Other sources alleged MWC sub-contracted the training to another unknown company and that the “trainees” were to be paid upwards of R10,000 for whatever work they would be undertaking.

When Kearney sought clarity from Human Settlements MEC Ravi Pillay, Pillay said he was unaware of any R75-million budget, and funds for Glebelands’ storm damage repairs would be coming from National Treasury. Neither, it seemed, was City Manager Sipho Nzuza aware of the budget or MWC contract when approached by a reporter for comment.

Inexperienced ‘assessors’ were seemingly appointed by MWC Global to inspect Glebelands water and sanitation systems. (Photo: supplied)

Not only did this raise security concerns but it also raised suspicions that the R75-million contract and any employment that flowed from it was being used to dispense patronage as residents claimed happened regularly whenever development took place at Glebelands.

Before and after: shoddy repairs to a burst underground pipe at Block R had to be redone four times in 2016. The pipe still leaks today. (Photo: supplied)

While it seems Makhathini Civils was contracted to repair Glebelands storm-damaged roofs using money from National Treasury and completed the work professionally, a big question mark hangs over the R75-million budget which seems to have materialised – and been spent – months before Treasury’s dispersal of emergency funds for eThekwini’s storm-damaged infrastructure.

Other question marks hang over MWC Global’s involvement, which, it seems, was limited solely to the training of “assessors” to inspect Glebelands’ ailing water systems – a separate contract entirely from the storm damage repairs. The PP has therefore been requested to investigate all aspects of the MWC Global contract, the R75-million budget and all contracts relating to Glebelands’ storm damage and plumbing repairs, upgrades and maintenance.

Anyone for tennis?

In July 2018, several months before the municipality saw fit to appoint a contractor to undertake urgent storm damage repairs, construction work began at the site of Glebelands’ defunct tennis courts. There was much speculation about whether this would perhaps be temporary accommodation for residents while their blocks were upgraded. But no, a few months later the community found that the municipality had instead gifted them new tennis courts. Tennis is not known for its popularity among hostel communities. In fact, no one is aware of a single resident who plays the sport. This is probably a blessing, because the new facility is kept locked. The PP has been asked to include this contract in any further investigations.

It would seem that even if correct financial procedures were adhered to, in light of the municipality’s failure to undertake critically-needed infrastructure repairs, maintenance, upgrades, and build new units to ease the chronic overcrowding, construction of a tennis court would constitute wasteful expenditure.

The more things change…

In April 2018, a media query revealed that the municipality and Department of Social Development (DSD) were lying to the PP in terms of their implementation of the PP’s recommendations. This was duly reported to the PP and concerns were raised regarding oversight. After being initially ignored, the matter was subsequently referred back to the KZN office of the PP after Professor McQuoid-Mason intervened (again). This led to an extremely hostile meeting some four months later in which local officials, who had clearly not bothered to read the report (which detailed at length what the municipality and DSD had failed to do), questioned community representatives’ observations regarding what was visibly obvious to anyone setting foot in Glebelands – that the hostel and its inhabitants remained neglected by all.

During the meeting the local PP officials also said their vehicles had been taken away from them and claimed the police had been unable to escort them on – it seemed – the only day of the year the officials had been available to visit Glebelands to inspect the municipality’s progress. Nothing further transpired for some time.

Predictably, Gumede’s utterances were not well received and angry residents demanded Malunga visit Glebelands to see for himself the harsh reality. During the community meeting that followed in April, Malunga made the startling revelation that the PP does not normally go to such lengths to monitor compliance with the PP’s recommendations.

There have been no consequences a year after the conclusion of the Moerane Commission – political killings continue. Two years have elapsed since the PP’s final report on Glebelands and there have been no consequences for the eThekwini Municipality or DSD – the graft and poor service delivery continue.

As was recently pointed out by the PP herself, the proper functioning of Chapter Nine institutions is critical in reducing state malfeasance, especially for communities and individuals who have no other access to justice. But these institutions are increasingly caught up in what their officials term “high impact” cases – stratospheric political squabbles that divert capacity from meaningful interventions where they are most needed.

But what is all too evident is that hostel dwellers’ deplorable living conditions are a brutal indictment of the ANC’s terminal allergy to accountability.

Vanessa Burger is an independent community activist for human rights and social justice. (Author’s note: The writer has no interest in the Public Protector’s investigations into senior politicians and believes all complaints should receive equal attention and equitable allocation of resources. This is very evidently not happening.)