GNU centre must hold — but it will not be easy, or simple

The formation of any coalition, never mind with parties whose constituencies are as far apart as in our society, is always fraught with difficulty. The unequal structure of our society may well make it extremely difficult for parties representing such different constituencies to work together.

Hanging over this is the issue of race. But equally, this may also be a significant step down the road to a society where race plays less of a role in our politics.

Twenty years ago, in 2004, most black people voted for the ANC while most white people voted for the DA. Racial identities were the single biggest determinant of support. Now those two parties are working together in government.

Considering that one of the major reasons they are working together is their stated shared belief in constitutionalism and the rule of law, and their shared antipathy to the EFF and MK, this may be more proof that good politics is about shared interests, which in this case are threatened by the comically misnamed Progressive Caucus.

There is immense irony in the fact that it was largely the work of the MK leader, former president Jacob Zuma, that forced the ANC to work with the DA. Had he not formed MK, both the ANC and the EFF could have won more votes, making a coalition between them less laboured and more realistic.

The other irony is that it is likely the DA will be able to keep Ramaphosa in power, and he may become the first President in SA’s democratic era to complete two full terms without being recalled by his party. (In total, he would have served two terms and roughly one year extra, as he completed Zuma’s term from 2018.)

It is unlikely the DA would work with any other ANC leader at present and this may prevent an organised rebellion against Ramaphosa.

Those who would support such a rebellion could end up forcing the ANC out of power and would lose their jobs in Parliament.

While some in the ANC might believe it is possible to unseat Ramaphosa, install a new leader and then form a coalition with MK, such a scenario would lead to dangerous instability, with most options ending very badly for those who instigate such a situation.

Because the personalities of ANC leaders have had such a significant impact (the Mbeki-led ANC was very different to the Zuma-led ANC, which in turn was a completely different animal from the Ramaphosa-led ANC), the DA may now influence the ANC leadership race to replace Ramaphosa. While this could never be explicit, ANC branches might well have to consider which candidate would be acceptable to members of the coalition government when voting at the party’s elective conference in December 2027.

Racial redress

However, there are immense risks to this coalition.

Its current formation includes parties which have campaigned directly against each other (particularly the DA vs the ANC, and the DA vs the Patriotic Alliance), that represent different ethnic groups (the IFP and the PA) and hold vastly different views on Israel’s actions in Gaza (the ANC supports Palestine, the DA says it believes in a “free and sovereign Palestine” but has supported Israel in the past and the PA strongly supports Israel now). On top of that, the ANC believes in racial redress (affirmative action and BEE) while the DA does not believe it is the best way to address SA’s multiple problems — to say the least.

While the IFP and the PA both garnered significant shares of the vote, the fact is that as long as the ANC and the DA agree, the government will hold. The key relationship is between them and any dispute resolution mechanism should start from that understanding.

This again underscores that the most likely issue on which this government could founder is race.

Already, the parties of the coalition government have committed to a “national dialogue”.

Before the election, it seemed a discussion along these lines would be more a distraction than anything else, but now, it could be vital to the future of this coalition.

Two other big risks lie ahead following the formation of this government.

First is that the parties overreach and approve legislation that is not necessarily a good thing for South Africa.

This could include introducing new thresholds for parties to be represented in councils. While this may be justified as being important to improve governance, it will also be in the parties’ interests.

Also, our electoral system now has to be reviewed. As the ANC and the DA both benefit from the current system, they may, again, ensure the system protects them.

Weakened oversight

This is what happened with the introduction of independent candidates. Because parties stood to lose from this, they worked together to make it difficult for them to enter Parliament. The result was the silly system that saw us having to vote on three ballots on election day, and the voter confusion coupled with delays that followed. 

In addition, oversight could end up much weakened. 

Both the EFF and MK may have caucuses with little experience. It seems likely that virtually no MK MPs will have been in Parliament before, while EFF leader Julius Malema has regularly replaced members of his caucus.

Because ANC and DA MPs will have common positions in committees, it may be hard to prevent them from forcing legislation through.

Second, perhaps more importantly, there is a real risk that our problems are just too difficult to resolve.

As Professor Steven Friedman has pointed out, if this government fails to improve the lived experience of many South Africans, the centre will be weakened.

This would strengthen the appeal of both MK and the EFF, which could have long-term consequences (of course, it seems unlikely that MK, a party formed only around the image of Zuma, will contest elections in 2029, but anything is possible over five years).

In the short term, the focus will be on the Cabinet and how Ramaphosa distributes executive power.

There may well be a period in which some parties behave almost schizophrenically, with some officials contradicting others. This will be because few people know how to act when our political gravity has changed so fundamentally: what was down is now up. 

There may also be a brief honeymoon period. But this is always short-lived — the nature of our problems is so urgent that action is required immediately. DM