Lessons from Zimbabwe’s GNU — how South Africa can avoid political complacency and missteps

13 Jan 2025

I was part of the MDC party that entered the Zimbabwean Government of National Unity (GNU) in February 2009. In many ways, the MDC got a better deal than the DA has cut with the ANC. But, despite our efforts, the MDC came out of the GNU poorly, as Zanu-PF used the GNU and the goodwill it generated internationally to hollow out the opposition and take the wind out of its sails.

Now that the dust has settled over the Government of National Unity and has begun to settle on a reasonably functional governance path, South Africa is breathing a sigh of relief. Had the ANC chosen to form a “doomsday” alliance with the MK party or the EFF — or both — we would by now be experiencing the consequences, including human and capital flight and the beginnings of the Russification of the country.

But this is no time for complacency. I was part of the MDC that entered the Zimbabwean Government of National Unity in February 2009. In many ways, the MDC got a better deal than the DA has cut with the ANC. The MDC’s leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, was made prime minister, I was the minister of education, sport and culture and Tendai Biti was given the Finance Ministry, among several others.

But, despite our efforts, the MDC — actually two parties, the MDC-M and the MDC-T — came out of the GNU poorly, as Zanu-PF used the GNU and the goodwill it generated internationally to hollow out the opposition and take the wind out of its sails. When the GNU was disbanded, Zanu-PF was stronger than ever and has managed by fair means and foul to stay in power ever since.

Here are some of the key lessons from our experience inside that GNU:

Assimilation of opposition

Soon after the formation of the GNU in February 2009 and the swearing-in of ministers, it became apparent that Zanu-PF would use the trappings of power to compromise MDC ministers. In my case, one of the first acts of the permanent secretary of the Ministry of Education was to focus on the need for me to acquire a new Mercedes Benz vehicle. This literally became the priority over the fact that about 8,000 schools were closed and more than 100,000 teachers were on strike when I took office. I resisted taking a new Mercedes Benz, but nearly all other MDC ministers succumbed and within a few months their public persona was no different to that of the Zanu-PF ministers.

Things went downhill from there. Several MDC ministers themselves sought perks. For example, some ministers insisted on being driven to the stairs of aircraft and insisted on emulating many of the practices of Zanu-PF ministers to enhance their status. In the case of Morgan Tsvangirai, he was given a luxurious home in Harare which became the subject of considerable controversy. The use of all the trappings of power resulted in MDC ministers being hard to distinguish from Zanu-PF ministers by the end of the GNU in 2013.

The stark difference between Zanu-PF leaders and MDC leaders prior to the GNU became fudged. As a result, those members of the electorate on the periphery of political parties, that is people who were not members of parties and had no real interest in parties, found very little to distinguish MDC ministers from Zanu-PF ministers, which led to apathy in the August 2013 election and a relatively low turnout.

Incompetence

In terms of the agreement that led to the GNU, the Cabinet was to be chaired by then President Robert Mugabe, (responsible for policy formulation), and a new body known as the Council of Ministers, chaired by Prime Minister Tsvangirai, was meant to be responsible for the implementation of the policies agreed by the cabinet. The creation of the Council of Ministers in theory provided a significant opportunity for Tsvangirai and the MDC parties to exercise power, but that opportunity was squandered.

The Council of Ministers was poorly run; it rarely started on time, was often cancelled and there was inadequate follow up on its resolutions. It stood in stark contrast to the cabinet itself which was punctual and orderly. Ministers would never miss cabinet meetings, whereas they regularly missed Council of Ministers meetings. That was partly of course created by Zanu-PF ministers who could not be held to account, and very little was done to exercise discipline. As a result, within a few months of the commencement of the GNU, it became increasingly obvious that power lay in the cabinet and all the real decisions were taken there. As time went on the Council of Ministers became more and more ineffective.

Naivety

While the two MDC parties did not have the support they needed from the SADC and the AU to force President Mugabe to allocate more influential ministries, the fact of the matter is that the two MDC parties were allocated what were termed “non-coercive” but important ministries, which included the ministries of Finance, Education, Health, and Industry and Commerce.

Most MDC ministers spent five years stabilising their respective ministries and their relevant spheres of influence, while at the same time Zanu-PF focused on consolidating its own power. By 2013 the economy had been stabilised, there were drugs back in hospitals, teachers were back teaching, hyperinflation had been tackled and, as a result, there was far less economic pain for people and far less reason for them to exercise a protest vote against Zanu-PF, as had happened in the March 2008 election. Zanu-PF cynically allowed this situation and allowed the ministries controlled by the MDC to prosper without allowing the MDC any headway in seeking to influence the coercive ministries held by Zanu-PF.

As a result, Zanu-PF’s control over the military, the police, the judiciary and the prison service remained unaltered. They retained all the levers of power while the MDC somewhat naively applied all its focus on service delivery. Not that that was wrong, but on reflection it is obvious that the leverage provided by running service ministries well was never exercised to effectively change the coercive structures of power.

Miscalculations around the constitution

Arguably the most important facet of the GNU was the constitutional reform process. While the new constitution which was endorsed by a referendum in March 2013 was a significant improvement on the Lancaster House Constitution, the deficiencies in the 2013 constitution illustrate the naivety and lack of tactical nous displayed by the two MDC parties during the GNU.

Relatively junior people were delegated to head the MDCs’ constitutional teams. Senior lawyers such as Tendai Biti and Welshman Ncube had their work cut out for them in challenging ministries and, while they were involved in the deadlock-breaking appeals committee, they were not in a position to fully devote their energies to the drafting of the constitution itself.

That situation was compounded by the fact that on some of the key debates regarding the constitution, the considerable leverage that the MDC parties had was not exercised. For example, when it came to the key argument regarding the separation of powers, and in particular the reduction of the executive’s powers, the two MDC parties made some key errors of judgement.

As a result, the Office of the President was left with vast powers and no real movement was made towards moving from a Westminster system to, for example, a proportional representation system. There was insufficient consultation and strategic planning within the two MDCs, something exacerbated by the fact that they remained separate political parties, and consequently there was very little constructive discussion and strategic planning between the two parties to come up with agreed positions.

Very often the MDC M party would end up being a mediator between the MDC T and Zanu-PF parties rather than the two MDC parties presenting an agreed unified front to the Zanu-PF position. That situation was further exacerbated by overconfidence within the MDC T, which thought that it would easily win the next election, and which did not share the MDC M’s disquiet regarding the substantial powers that were left in the hands of the executive.

Little reform to key institutions

While the new constitution recognised key institutions such as the judiciary and media and while it had new measures, which in theory enhanced the independence of institutions, in practical terms very little was done to reform those institutions.

In the case of the judiciary, there was hardly any noticeable reform. The existing judges remained. Although there were key changes to the constitution to strengthen the independence of the judiciary there were inadequate safeguards to protect those provisions. Furthermore, inadequate measures were taken to entrench the independence of the judiciary. But perhaps the most significant failure was the failure of the two MDC parties to effect change in the composition of the judiciary during the five years of the GNU through the swearing-in of new judges who had no obvious party affiliation. The net result was that by the end of the GNU, there were theoretical changes to the constitutional structure of the judiciary but very little practical change, and even the constitutional protections were easy to amend, as has in fact happened.

The same applies to the media. While there is one provision in the constitution (Section 62(4)) that tried to enforce the notion of an independent state media, there was little else in the constitution focused on practically allowing the development of a vibrant and independent media in Zimbabwe. By the end of the GNU, there were still no independent radio or television stations and all the television and radio stations in 2013 remained either in the direct or indirect control of Zanu-PF.

As a result of this, both the judiciary and the media since 2013 have remained largely within the control of Zanu-PF and the Emmerson Mnangagwa government has amended the constitution and implemented policies that have made both institutions more partisan than they have ever been.

The same applies to other institutions such as universities and constitutional commissions such as the Electoral Commission, Human Rights Commission and Anti-Corruption Commission. All of these bodies, while recognised by the constitution as “independent”, are less independent now than their equivalent bodies were in 2008.

Lessons for the DA

While the current situation in South Africa is substantially different to the conditions in Zimbabwe between 2009 and 2013 there, are some lessons to be learnt:

DA ministers need to resist the trappings of power and should rather eschew as many of the current Cabinet benefits as possible. Much of this is a matter of public perception, but a collective effort should be made towards setting a different standard for ministers in terms of entourages, cavalcades and many of the symbols of power that irritate the general public and give the impression that there is no difference between DA and ANC Cabinet members.

I have been impressed by the apparent work ethic and output of many DA ministers since taking office, and this must be continued. The GNU is a marathon, not a sprint, and it is necessary to set out clear annual goals for the DA ministries together with overarching goals for the life of the GNU. Then a vigorous public media campaign must be adopted, going beyond the individual ministers themselves (some of whom are better at social media than others) to publicise and mark those goals and their achievement. The corollary to this is that the DA must not hesitate to do all in its power to remove and replace non-performing ministers.

The DA needs to pay attention to areas which it does not control, particularly with regard to the safeguarding of the electoral process, the independence of the media, judiciary, civic bodies and universities. It is critical that they do all in their power to build these institutions, whose independence should be enhanced during the tenure of the GNU.

An increasing focus should be on the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and its member states. While foreign policy concerns beyond the SADC are obviously important, the future of democracy in South Africa will ultimately depend on whether a majority of SADC countries become democratic or not. In other words, in my view the primary foreign policy goal should be the democratisation of the region rather than international issues such as, for example, Ukraine and Gaza. While these international issues obviously remain important, my view is that the DA should focus on a strident foreign policy that will, for example, enhance free, fair, lawful and independently run elections in the region and see the restoration of the SADC Tribunal. DM

This was first published by The Brenthurst Foundation

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