Navigating the US-SA relationship crisis means performing a delicate geopolitical balancing act

While the US and South Africa have not historically been the best of friends, the bilateral relationship has reached a new low in recent months, with Washington responding to points of tension in a punitive rather than diplomatic fashion.

South Africa’s 2024 decision to take Israel to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) alleging it is committing a genocide seems to have tipped US frustration into outright retaliation.

The expulsion last week of South Africa’s ambassador to the US, Ebrahim Rasool, alongside Washington’s inflammatory rhetoric around offering Afrikaner “refugees” a pathway to citizenship, marks a sharp downturn in relations that have already cooled.

Far from being an isolated issue, the rift must be seen against the backdrop of long-standing tension between South Africa and the US, notably for Washington’s historical position on apartheid, while its more recent allegations of arms shipments to Russia have not helped.

The African National Congress (ANC) has long viewed the US with suspicion, stemming largely from the US’s policy of “constructive engagement” with South Africa’s white-minority regime in the 1980s. While much of the world, including many European countries, imposed sanctions on the apartheid regime, Washington was hesitant and preferred to pursue a strategy of engagement, which it said would lead to reform.

This was, however, interpreted by the ANC and others agitating for liberation as amounting to tacit support. Beyond this, even after the end of apartheid, the US kept South Africa’s first democratic president, Nelson Mandela, on a terror watchlist until 2008 – well after his presidency ended.

This historical context has shaped South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy under consecutive ANC governments, which has consistently sought to assert an independent, non-aligned stance, often at odds with Western expectations.

While relations improved after the end of apartheid, certain points of friction persisted - South Africa’s close ties with Cuba, its criticism of Nato interventions, and its championing of Palestinian rights have long irritated Washington.

More recently, Pretoria’s so-called neutral stance on the Russia-Ukraine war and its hosting of joint naval exercises with Russia and China further aggravated the US.

But it seems nothing has riled Washington quite like South Africa’s decision to take Israel to the ICJ.

South Africa’s case at the ICJ accuses Israel of genocide in Gaza, an allegation that strikes at the heart of Washington’s most sacrosanct alliance. The US response was swift and hostile. Then National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby dismissed the case as “meritless” and “completely without basis”, while other officials reinforced the message.

Not long thereafter, these terse words morphed into a more tangible response when Washington took steps that many in South Africa have seen as punitive, including a renewed threat to the country’s Agoa status, which provides it duty-free access to US markets.

Given South Africa is one of the largest beneficiaries of Agoa, with over 21% of its exports to the US enjoying preferential trade terms in 2022, this poses a significant economic risk. US legislators, especially Republican hardliners, have called for the country to be removed from Agoa, citing Pretoria’s foreign policy at odds with US national security interests as a justification.

The ICJ case against Israel has only intensified these calls. A review of Agoa is expected later this year, and the pressure to strip South Africa of its Agoa benefits has only grown, while some have suggested South Africa should exit before it can be kicked out.

The US then took the extraordinary step of expelling South Africa’s ambassador Rasool in what is widely seen as a retaliatory move. While Washington has provided little public justification, diplomatic sources indicate that Rasool’s outspoken criticism of the US policy - notably on Palestine - played a role, with his comments about white supremacy being used as a basis for his removal.

Declaring an ambassador persona non grata is a particularly caustic diplomatic measure, typically reserved for cases of espionage or serious misconduct.

Moreover, while the US exercised its rights under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, it was in keeping with the letter rather than the spirit of law, communicating this decision via X rather than the customary note verbale.

The Trump administration’s rhetoric around so-called race laws and the prospect of a “refugee” programme for Afrikaners has come as a further escalation.

In February, a White House executive order directed US agencies to explore resettlement options for Afrikaners, citing “racial discrimination” in South Africa’s land reform policies, with Secretary of State Marco Rubio refusing to attend the G20 in Johannesburg as a result.

The ANC government has criticised this as a gross mischaracterisation of domestic policies and an attempt to stoke racial tensions.

The claim that white South Africans are being systematically persecuted is a narrative that has long circulated among far-right groups in the US and Europe, despite little evidence to support it. That the US government is now lending credence to this claim, while perhaps speaking to the thrust of Republican politics now, has ironically seen South Africa draw closer together.

South Africa, for its part, has refused to back down. President Ramaphosa has made it clear that Pretoria “will not be bullied” into changing its foreign policy and will not be dictated to by foreign powers.

The ANC has also used the dispute to rally domestic support, framing it as yet another instance of Western hypocrisy, where human rights are weaponised selectively, and international law is upheld only when it serves US interests.

The South African government has also sought to shore up alliances in response to Washington’s actions, with Foreign Minister Ronald Lamola saying last month that he is mobilising support from BRICS partners to counterbalance Western pressure, further entrenching its pivot towards a multipolar world order.

Moreover, the recent EU-South Africa Summit saw overtures being made by way of more investment.

These circumstances bring an uncomfortable position to bear. On the one hand, the US approach to South Africa risks backfiring - if Washington’s goal is to pressure Pretoria into compliance, it is unlikely to succeed. The ANC’s historical resistance to Western pressure runs deep, and any perceived attempt at coercion is likely to strengthen its resolve rather than weaken it as has been indicated by Pretoria’s early response.

Moreover, alienating South Africa could potentially have broader geopolitical consequences. Pretoria remains a leading voice in the Global South, and its treatment by Washington will be closely watched by other developing nations, especially those who desire a move away from US hegemony towards a more multipolar world.

Should the US be seen as using economic and diplomatic muscle unduly to punish a country for taking a moral stand on Palestine, with that position undergirded by liberal democratic values the US is supposed to be the guarantor of, it risks further eroding that country’s already fragile credibility in the Global South.

But, on the other hand, for South Africa the economic stakes are high. Losing Agoa benefits would deal a significant blow to key export sectors and, while alternative trade partners exist, replacing US market access will not be easy.

Yet for the ANC, the cost of backing down may be higher. South Africa has positioned itself as a champion of human rights and international law (although this is not always consistently applied), and reversing course under US pressure would be politically untenable.

This standoff could, theoretically at least, present an opportunity for both nations to reconsider their approach. A more pragmatic approach - one that acknowledges South Africa’s right to an independent foreign policy while seeking common ground - would likely serve US interests far better than heavy-handed retaliation.

Realistically, however, this will not be the Trump administration’s course of action, even when it seems to be losing the art of the deal.

For South Africa, navigating this crisis will require strategic diplomacy. Maintaining principled positions on international issues while safeguarding economic interests will be a delicate balance - South Africa’s challenge is to ensure that its foreign policy independence does not come at the cost of economic self-sabotage.

To this end, Pretoria must think carefully about efforts at getting bilateral relations back on course. Its next pick for ambassador will be crucial in this regard.

Ultimately, this crisis is about more than just the ICJ case or even US- South Africa relations; it is a microcosm of the broader tension shaping the global order, where the Global South is increasingly asserting itself against Western dominance.

How this dispute unfolds may well shape the trajectory of US engagement with Africa and beyond for the coming Trump years. DM

Lisa Otto is Associate Professor and SARChI Chair: African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy at the University of Johannesburg.