Pretoria persists with its softly-softly approach towards Zimbabwe, despite ominous signs

The South African government is clearly very concerned about the growing Zanu-PF government clampdown on its opponents in Zimbabwe. The clampdown reached a crescendo with the Zimbabwean government’s draconian stifling of the big nationwide protests against corruption and Zanu-PF itself across the country on Friday 31 July. 

The arrests and alleged torture of political opponents and journalists associated with the protest are being seen as signs of growing political repression and frustration by President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s government. His half-hearted reforms – which were supposed to save the country after he ousted Robert Mugabe in November 2017 – seem to be going nowhere and Covid-19 is driving another nail into the coffin of the economy. 

South Africa’s ambassador to Harare, Mphakama Mbete, is very likely sending alarm signals back to head office, analysts believe. 

And his boss, International Relations and Cooperation Minister Naledi Pandor, is very likely shaking her head in dismay and alarm.

But, if Pretoria has any ideas about what to actually do about events north of the Limpopo, it’s keeping them very close to its chest. It has remained silent, as usual, watching the crisis unfold. 

Piers Pigou, a senior consultant to the International Crisis Group on Southern Africa, notes that Pandor hinted at a “significant pivot” in South Africa’s approach to Zimbabwe last November. 

She told a seminar at Unisa that South Africa might need to go beyond calling for an end to international sanctions against Zimbabwe and “begin a process of reflecting on the solutions that could be considered to actively address the challenges”.

She noted that Zimbabwe’s “political dynamics are inextricably linked to the economy and thus should be confronted simultaneously”. And she specifically raised “the possibility of initiating an inclusive political dialogue” in the country. 

So, Pigou said Pandor had made the point that the state of the economy was not only about sanctions but also about the state of politics. 

And he notes that Mbete took Pandor’s thinking further in a speech to the inaugural Political Actors Dialogue (Polad) Economic Summit in Harare in February. 

Addressing Mnangagwa, among others, he said that Zimbabwe would have to enact considerable business-friendly reforms if it hoped to attract investment. But he also linked the economy to political reform when he added that for Zimbabwe to revive its economy, the establishment of a social contract involving politicians, business people and citizens would be critical.

“Research shows that nations with disruptive political-economic situations are likely to be poor compared to those with inclusive economics, where the rule of law is protected and ransacking political manipulation is not tolerated,” Mbete said, pointedly. 

Yet, as Pigou says, despite its awareness of the cause of Zimbabwe’s crisis, the South African government does not seem to have found an entry point to try to foster that political dialogue which Pandor proposed between Zanu-PF and the MDC Alliance-led opposition and civil society opposition, which have become increasingly polarised over the last few months. 

He notes that after former President Thabo Mbeki visited Harare in December 2019, there was some hope he would return in 2020 on a mediation mission. But it turned out there was no real appetite for external involvement – at least not from Zanu-PF, according to MDC Alliance leaders who insisted at the time they were keen for Mbeki to get involved. 

There is a strong but unconfirmed belief that Mnangagwa and Vice-President Constantino Chiwenga, the former military commander, are engaged in a power struggle. Chiwenga conspired with Mnangagwa to topple Mugabe in a de facto military coup.