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The Red Sea flashpoint — is another Horn of Africa war inevitable?

The Red Sea flashpoint — is another Horn of Africa war inevitable?
Hafte Gebreselassie Gebrihet
By Hafte Gebreselassie Gebrihet
16 Mar 2025
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Although conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea appears likely, it is not an unavoidable outcome. Diplomatic engagement could still avert a full-scale war – but the time for action is now.

The Horn of Africa stands at a dangerous crossroads, with tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea threatening to reignite large-scale conflict. Tigray remains caught in the middle, a potential battleground in a war that could reshape regional power dynamics and destabilise the Red Sea corridor. 

Lieutenant General Tsadkan Gebretensae, vice-president and head of the Democratisation Cabinet Secretariat of the Tigray Interim Administration, recently warned that hostilities between the two nations seem “inevitable”, with military preparations already under way. However, is war truly inevitable, or are there still diplomatic off-ramps that could prevent another devastating chapter in the region’s history?

High-stakes geopolitical chess game


At the heart of the rising tensions lies a complex web of geopolitical rivalries. Eritrea, under its authoritarian leader, Isaias Afwerki, views the Tigray Defence Forces (TDF) as both a threat and a tool to destabilise Ethiopia’s government under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. Asmara’s frustration over the 2022 Pretoria Agreement – which ended the Tigray war but left Eritrea sidelined – continues to shape its strategic calculations. Allegations persist that Eritrea is exploiting internal divisions within Tigray, attempting to manoeuvre the TDF into a conflict that could serve its interests before eventually turning against them.

Conversely, Ethiopia seems to be exploiting the internal divisions within Tigray, specifically between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) led by Dr Debretsion Gebremichael and the interim administration headed by Getachew Reda. Addis Ababa has accused Eritrea of undermining the Pretoria Agreement while positioning itself to exploit any emerging conflict between Tigray factions. Ethiopia’s controversial push for Red Sea access further exacerbates tensions. The build-up of Ethiopian federal forces, coupled with its large-scale drone manufacturing efforts, suggests that Ahmed's administration is preparing for potential escalation. Whether these moves are purely defensive or signal broader military ambitions remains unclear.

Tigray itself faces an uncertain future. The internal split between the TPLF and the interim administration complicates any unified strategy. While some within the TPLF may entertain temporary cooperation with Eritrea to counter Ethiopia, historical animosities stemming from the 1998-2000 border war and Eritrea’s devastating role in the recent Tigray conflict make such alliances tenuous and fraught with risk. The failure to implement the Pretoria Agreement creates a conducive environment for the TDF to either collaborate with or at least threaten the Ethiopian government by suggesting potential collaboration with Eritrean forces. The TDF, as a capable military force, holds substantial leverage in shaping the region’s future. However, its position is weakened by internal divisions, leaving Tigray vulnerable to external manipulation and, ultimately, becoming a battlefield for larger geopolitical ambitions.

Let us be clear: any cooperation between Eritrea and the TDF, the Tigray interim government and Ethiopia is inherently temporary. Each actor is playing a high-stakes game with the ultimate aim of eliminating the others. Eritrea seeks to destabilise Ethiopia while crushing the TPLF. The TPLF seeks to topple Ahmed while neutralising Eritrea. Ethiopia aims to dismantle the Eritrean government, secure control over the Red Sea and eliminate the TPLF as a political and military threat. Each side believes it can outmanoeuvre the others – but history shows that such gambles often lead to mutual destruction.

Who will win? The reality is that this war will have no winner. Any renewed conflict would be devastating for all parties involved, with civilians bearing the brunt of the suffering. The longer these tensions worsen, the closer the region inches toward catastrophic violence that no actor can truly control.

Could war be averted?


Although conflict appears likely, it is not an unavoidable outcome. Diplomatic engagement, if pursued with urgency and commitment, could still avert a full-scale war. The Pretoria Agreement offers a framework for de-escalation, but its success hinges on genuine implementation and enforcement. Eritrea’s alleged destabilisation efforts in Ethiopia’s Amhara region and the broader contest over Red Sea access present substantial hurdles to sustained peace.

External actors will play a decisive role in determining whether the Horn of Africa moves towards war or peace. Gulf states, with their economic and strategic interests in the Red Sea, could serve as mediators. However, their rivalries often exacerbate rather than resolve conflicts. The United Arab Emirates (UAE), which maintains close ties to both Ethiopia and Eritrea, could act as a potential broker – or a facilitator of further escalation. Meanwhile, Egypt’s antagonism towards Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam adds yet another layer of geopolitical complexity.

Western powers have shown little appetite for meaningful intervention beyond diplomatic statements. Preoccupied with conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, their engagement in the Horn of Africa remains largely rhetorical. History offers little reason to expect decisive Western action; how often have “letters of concern” or symbolic sanctions stopped wars? In the absence of a recognition of the stakes and a move beyond letters of concern by the US and Europe, their influence is likely to remain minimal.

If war is to be prevented, the time for action is now. Regional and global actors must prioritise diplomatic solutions, enforce existing agreements and address the underlying security concerns driving Ethiopia and Eritrea towards conflict. Without sustained pressure and real consequences for warmongering behaviours, the Horn of Africa faces the dire prospect of yet another devastating war. The question is not whether war can be stopped, it is whether those with the power to prevent it are willing to act decisively. 

The African Union’s paralysis: a structural failure?


Despite its mandate to maintain peace on the continent, the African Union (AU) has remained largely ineffective as tensions escalate. Its failure to enforce previous agreements, including the Pretoria Agreement, underscores its declining credibility. Yet the AU’s inaction is not simply a matter of neglect. Structural limitations, including the lack of enforcement mechanisms and the competing interests of member states, cripple its ability to respond effectively.

Ethiopia’s influence within the AU further complicates the organisation’s ability to act impartially. As the host nation for the AU headquarters and a major financial contributor, Ethiopia holds substantial sway over the organisation’s decisions. This raises fundamental concerns about the AU’s ability to mediate fairly and impartially in a conflict where Addis Ababa is a primary actor.

Without meaningful reform, the AU risks becoming an increasingly irrelevant institution, unable to prevent or resolve the very conflicts it was established to address. The current crisis between Ethiopia and Eritrea is a stark reminder that without genuine enforcement capabilities and the political will to use them, the AU remains a toothless body in the face of escalating violence.

The cost of inaction


The human and geopolitical costs of renewed conflict in the Horn of Africa would be catastrophic. The recent Tigray war claimed an estimated 600,000 lives; a broader war involving Ethiopia, Eritrea and potentially other regional actors could surpass that death toll. Beyond the immediate humanitarian disaster, prolonged conflict would destabilise the Red Sea corridor, exacerbating crises in neighbouring countries like Sudan, Somalia and Yemen.

The consequences would extend beyond the Horn of Africa. Given the region’s strategic importance for global trade and security, instability could disrupt maritime routes through the Red Sea, heightening economic and security risks far beyond the African continent. 

The coming months will be pivotal. The Horn of Africa stands on the cliff of war. Whether the region steps back or plunges into conflict will depend on the actions of both local actors and the international community. It is unequivocal that the consequences of inaction will be quantified in terms of lives lost and a region engulfed in preventable violence. DM

Hafte Gebreselassie Gebrihet is a postdoctoral research fellow at the Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance, University of Cape Town. His research focuses on building democratic governance and resilient institutions in Africa with particular emphasis on the UN Agenda 2030 and the Africa Agenda 2063. [email protected]

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