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SA aligns foreign policy on countries wracked by civil war with economic interests

Examining when South Africa acts or the President issues statements on civil conflicts taking place across Africa shows an apparent correlation with economic interests.

There are presently six major civil conflicts in Africa. These are wars between governments and forces within their sovereign territory wishing to displace them or to form breakaway states.

What has South Africa’s policy position been towards each conflict within the continent? In short, they are complex, but the country reliably stands with the ruling governments and advances negotiated solutions as well as post-conflict developmentalism.

Occasionally, the country does get involved through diplomatic efforts or peacekeeping. But the main determinant of interest seems to be trade.

The DRC


By far the most visible role South Africa has played in a civil war is the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The conflict involves many players, layers and narratives. From the South African vantage point, however, it is a humanitarian crisis that is unsustainable and blameable on M23 and its Rwandan backer.

South Africa also has an economic stake. Notwithstanding unverified claims by Rwanda that President Cyril Ramaphosa has a personal investment which he is using the national military to defend, the DRC and South Africa have seen enormous growth in two-way trade under his tenure.

When he first took office in 2018, South Africa was importing R387.8-million worth of Congolese goods. Since then it has climbed steadily and stood at R1.5-billion in 2024. Exports have seen even greater growth, moving from R11.725-billion in 2017 to R24.9-billion now.

The trade basket mainly consists of copper, tin and wood in South African imports, while exports have consisted of electrical machinery, grains, energy and vehicles.

Central African Republic


Not as economically vibrant, the relationship between the CAR and South Africa has nevertheless seen some modest growth under Ramaphosa – with imports by South Africa growing from R1.07-million in 2017 to R7.6-million by 2023. In turn, exports have grown from R6.6-million to R37.7-million.

The CAR’s is another protracted conflict on the continent, with many layers and players. It has its roots in the country’s sectarian divides. Since a 2003 coup the country’s northern region has fallen under rebel control. Indeed, about 70% of the country is not under government administration.

About one million of the country’s people are displaced by violence and 5.6% of the population died in 2022 – twice the rate of any other country in the world.

With renewed fighting since 2020, the South African government has not been vocal on the conflict. The last statement by the Department of International Relations and Cooperation seems to have been issued on 21 February 2019.

Ethiopia


Since 1961 (the year the eventually successful Eritrean War of Independence began), Ethiopia has had some level of civil conflict going on in one region or another.

However, the nearly three decades between 1991 and 2020 saw a much calmer Ethiopia emerge, with the country managing to grow its economy by an average of 10% per year between 2004 and 2019. Following some controversial reforms by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, in 2020 the Tigray region in the north refused to postpone that year’s scheduled election. By November fighting had broken out and a two-year civil war ensued.

South Africa’s position on the civil war was never pronounced – in line with the country’s general approach, but also reflective of the awkwardness many countries contend with when there is a conflict in Ethiopia, the seat of the African Union. It was that body which Ramaphosa entrusted with resolving the crisis.

Still, South Africa did play a constructive and proactive role in mediating the crisis in 2022. The Cessation of Hostilities Agreement which ended the conflict was signed in Pretoria in November of that year and, despite the precarity that surrounded it when it was initially concluded, it seems to be holding.

There are still numerous other civil and secessionist wars taking place throughout Ethiopia, including the country’s largest region, Oromia, as well as Amhara in the north, and Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambela in the west. The wars are driven by secessionism, internal territorial disputes and complex networks of alliance and violence among non-state armed forces.

South Africa’s imports from Ethiopia, led by coffee, tea and other agricultural products, grew from R109.46-million in 2017 to R167.81-million by 2023. On the other hand, exports to Ethiopia, primarily consisting of agricultural as well as advanced electrical machinery, have declined from R874.50-million in 2017 to R570.75-million.

Libya


The Libyan Civil War, which began in earnest in February 2011, worsened with the capture and killing of the country’s president, Muammar Gaddafi, in March. Since 2014 the country has had two governments disputing the legitimacy of the other.

Matters changed for a while in 2021 when a government of national unity was formed, but this too was followed by the formation of a rival government of national stability in Benghazi, supported by the Libyan National Army but with much less international recognition.

The oil-producing nation has, however, managed to export the resource at inconsistent levels that still typically reach one million barrels per day despite the impact of the civil war on the management of the National Oil Corporation and periods of blockade of its ports by the warring sides (2021) and by protesters (2022). But all sides recognise the centrality of oil to the national economy – accounting for 98% of government revenue.

South Africa, primarily importing its petroleum from Saudi Arabia according to the Department of Mineral Resources, does not consume much from Libya. Indeed imports have declined in recent years, from R3.8-million in 2017 to R0.977-million in 2023.

Exports to Libya, by contrast, grew from R26.58-million in 2017 to R134-million in 2024, consisting of aircraft, machinery and agricultural goods – crossing the R100-million mark for the first time.

Somalia


The civil war in Somalia has its roots in the collapse of the central government in 1991 and subsequent infighting among the rebel forces. Islamist groups emerged to fill the vacuum but soon morphed into terrorist organisations. This is a conflict on which South Africa and the President have been very quiet, save on general Africa-wide sets of remarks, especially in Ramaphosa’s first year in office.

Imports from Somalia grew from a very low R0.359-million in 2017 to R4-million in 2024, while South African exports rose from R165.64-million in 2017 to R169-million in 2024.

Sudan


In May 2024, the South African government expressed concern over the conflict in Sudan, which broke out on 15 April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces. South Africa emphasised  the importance of “a Sudanese-owned and Sudanese-led inclusive dialogue, paving the way for a return to the transition process towards a civilian-led, democratic government”.

Imports from Sudan declined from R6.87-million in 2017 to R1.12-million in 2023. Exports have also followed a largely downward trend, from R511.18-million in 2017 to R381.82-million in 2023. As growth was being seen up to 2020, the catalyst for the downward trend seems to have been Covid-19 combined with the coup which precipitated the civil war.

When does South Africa take a stand?


Examining when South Africa acts or the President issues statements on civil conflicts taking place across Africa shows an apparent correlation with economic interests.

Among the six surveyed war situations, South Africa has only recently issued statements on the DRC, Ethiopia and Sudan – what also joins these countries is that South Africa has exports totalling the minimum threshold of R500-million per year in the Ramaphosa era.

No statements have recently been made regarding the CAR, Libya and Somalia, with whom there is generally low trade. This might be a coincidence, but it also seems consistent. It is also an all-too-rare realpolitik for South Africa: having economic policy lead its foreign policy. This is a positive development.

Economic instruments such as sanctions are typically not a serious option for the continent’s would-be peacemakers. This is largely due to generally low but growing trade relations within the continent.

Pretoria can only be a major force on the continent if it has strong economic ties with, and thus potential leverage towards, the countries in conflict. DM

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