All bets are off — SA is a ‘bad deal’ for the US and it needs to deal with this new reality

Now that US President Donald Trump’s opening salvos have been fired through a raft of executive orders and public statements, many countries are grappling with how to respond. 

As one of those singled out as a bad apple by Washington, South Africa must quickly come to terms with what exactly it is dealing with. The country’s foreign policy approach towards the US will need to radically differ from anything that has come before. 

Just four weeks into the second Trump administration, the broad contours of the US’ new foreign policy trajectory are clear. Three key issues stand out. 

First, Washington seems set on abdicating its role as the steward of liberal international institutionalism, something that enjoyed bipartisan support in almost all previous administrations and was the centrepiece of its post-Cold War foreign policy. 

Since Trump took office, about 91 executive actions have been taken, of which foreign policy has featured most prominently. They all reflect a common theme: how the US-backed international order of old has essentially led to a “bad deal” for US citizens. 

Various actions point to a clear break in US foreign policy. These include seeking to withdraw from global organisations, imposing duties on neighbouring states and other major international actors, re-evaluating foreign aid and clarifying that the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s global tax deal “has no force or effect in the US”. As US author Hal Brands argues, this underscores the lack of “any outsized ethos of responsibility for the international order”.

Second, Washington seems comfortable – if not intent – on maligning its natural friends and allies in pursuing an “America First” agenda. The general theme of the US caught in a raft of bad deals with countries like Canada, North Atlantic Treaty Organization partners and the European Union is at the centre of Trump’s foreign policy priorities. 

Coupled with this approach is a scepticism and disregard for global rules, norms and institutions evident in the first Trump administration and which have come to the fore again. An example is Trump’s plans to take ownership of and “develop” the Gaza Strip.

The net effect is a faltering transatlantic partnership in which Europeans see the US more as a strategic partner or rival than an ally. Perceptions of the US as an unpredictable, disinterested or malign force in global affairs will likely become more pronounced. 

This may be felt most acutely by its historical partners that have long counted on previous US administrations’ security assurances across Europe, the Asia-Pacific and Americas.

Third, the US Department of State, and by extension the country’s foreign service, is also likely to be affected by the current administration’s extreme contempt for the “deep” or “administrative” state. Referring to the large bureaucracy that has developed in and around the US federal government system over decades, Trump has taken aim at this workforce. 

Comprising non-elected professionals and technical experts, Trump appears resolute in cutting inefficiencies and drastically reducing the size of this workforce. These efforts are billed as injecting a “democratic” culture into federal government operations by raising the influence of elected officials relative to apolitical bureaucrats (who Trump believes frustrated policy processes during his first term). 

This may hollow out the foreign policy establishment, as experts’ ability to independently craft and implement policy is eroded in favour of political appointees who advance Trump’s agenda. 

For South African policymakers and government officials, it’s vital to recognise these features of US foreign policy, and just how much of a break with the past they represent. 

Whereas past Democrat and Republican administrations framed their engagements with Pretoria under the rubric of common values and interests, the current one has no qualms about calling South Africa a bad apple because its bilateral relations simply constitute a bad deal.

The recent bewilderment expressed by former president Thabo Mbeki on the executive order targeting South Africa, which was issued without appropriate diplomatic engagement, is telling. In seeking to understand Trump’s decision, Mbeki said Pretoria had built considerable rapport with past Republican administrations – despite disagreements on certain issues. 

This is a misreading of the current situation. The Trump administration is in no way similar to any past “establishment” Republican governments. It is far more dangerous and unpredictable – a political force bent on upending the rules of the game established by past administrations for the effective functioning of international order. 

In this context, South Africa is an easy country to be made an example of. Domestic legislation aimed at redressing structural inequalities due to the legacy of apartheid mirrors the diversity, equity and inclusion legislation in the US that Trump seeks to undo. 

And South Africa’s foreign policy positions in recent years – its non-condemnation of Russia’s Ukraine invasion, growing ties with China and Iran (through BRICS), solidarity with Cuba and the Palestinian cause – all place Pretoria squarely within Washington’s sights. 

Finally, the current administration may see US aid and development assistance to South Africa as something deeply embedded in the “deep” state policy networks that it is so set on dismantling. 

In sum, South Africa is a bad deal for the US – and Pretoria can bet that Trump will not stop reminding it of this for the foreseeable future. 

How to improve this overall deal should be top of South African government officials’ minds. Specific points of leverage and contention must be identified and worked on. These could include exploring a direct bilateral trade agreement, agreeing to disagree on certain international policy issues, and establishing direct links between South African officials and their Washington counterparts. 

Pretoria must acknowledge this new reality. The ball is firmly in its court, and it needs to make sense of the new rules of engagement, and how this game should be played. 

Traditional diplomatic avenues for engagement may be ineffective, no matter how skilled or professional South Africa’s diplomats working on the US are. Established methods may pay dividends with other international partners, but the US under the current administration is a special case and should be treated as such. DM 

Priyal Singh, senior researcher, Africa in the World, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Pretoria.

First published by ISS Today.

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