Pretoria’s measured response of strategic non-retaliation in the wake of President Donald Trump slapping sweeping tariffs on friends and foes alike - including a whooping 30% on South Africa - is commendable.
The country should also celebrate that it has been included in the 90-day negotiation window that Washington has offered some of its trade partners to make “good and beautiful deals” with the Trump administration. President Cyril Ramaphosa’s appointment of Mcebisi Jonas as special envoy to the US demonstrates such movement in the right direction.
Should the controversies surrounding some of Jonas’ remarks around President Trump imperil his candidature or compromise his mission, Pretoria may well be advised to consider former president Thabo Mbeki as special US envoy.
Besides his grasp of the nuances in the tension between the two countries, Mbeki has been in roles akin to special envoy since his retirement, albeit acting on behalf of the African Union.
While unusual, former heads of states have acted as envoys and even ambassadors for their countries post incumbency, with the current Australian Ambassador to the US, Kevin Rudd, having previously served as Canberra’s prime minister.
South Africa’s troubled past and polarised present have undermined the country’s elite formation process, leading to a non-inclusive pool mostly dominated by ANC-linked personalities in key appointments. The country could benefit from a more inclusive and diverse elite pool in the business, political and intellectual classes.
In this regard, retired Justices Johan Froneman or Johann van der Westhuizen could be brought into the special envoy matrix to assist in debunking some of the misrepresentations around private property rights and persecution of minorities. The country could do with some “constitutionalism diplomacy”, a key pillar of the national interest.
Jonas’ appointment would best be promptly followed by an announcement of a career trade diplomat as ambassador to Washington. A special envoy’s work will be hollow without a substantive ambassador on the ground, focused on the technical aspects of the relationship.
However, appointments of both a special envoy and substantive ambassador to Washington would be moot if not accompanied by a compelling negotiation strategy. Such a strategy would of course be premised on what it is that the Trump administration wants from South Africa.
And whether Pretoria can offer whatever it is that the US wants, in a case where South Africa cannot make such a provision, what could be the compromise that both Pretoria and Washington would find acceptable?
While Pretoria may seem to be entering into the negotiations on the back foot due to the plethora of issues that the Trump administration has thus far raised, all is not lost to still make a compelling offer to the US.
Unlike other US trading partners, where the US has been clear on what it requires from them, the South African case is complex in that, while the Trump administration has indicated what it is that it’s not happy with when it comes to South Africa, Washington has not been forthright on what it requires from Pretoria.
The Trump administration has on different occasions mentioned South Africa’s foreign policy posture on Israel-Palestine and Iran. Further, the Trump administration has cited alleged genocide against the Afrikaner community and the threat posed to private property rights as areas of divergence with Pretoria.
These are issues that cannot be solely remedied through trade and investment policy, which is an area of key focus for Trump’s tariff diplomacy. This makes a case for a multipronged negotiation strategy with the United States. The special envoy seems to be indeed more suited to the non-trade issues, while the ambassador will have to focus on the technical, economic and commercial diplomacy matters.
US tariffs seem to be aimed at serving two main purposes. Firstly, an industrial policy objective of bringing back manufacturing to the US through import substitution, including elements of decoupling and derisking from China. Secondly, tariff diplomacy seems to be a “bazooka approach” aimed at bringing various trading partners to some sort of negotiation table and extracting concessions dependent on what those countries can offer the US.
In this regard, the first countries targeted by the tariff strategy are those that have substantial manufacturing capacity with roots in the United States. These include large economies such as China and the European Union. The tariffs are intended at reshoring production from those economies back to the US. One could argue that the US has a clear-cut demand from these countries.
South Africa does not have a sizeable production capacity that can be said to have undercut the US manufacturing base. Pretoria therefore falls under the category of US trade and investment partners from which the US has no clear demand.
Within that category, South Africa occupies a special place from which the US knows it can extract something substantial. Washington may at this stage be aware of what it wants from South Africa - or not too sure what it wants from Pretoria.
This ambiguity presents both strategic challenges and opportunities for Pretoria. Obviously, the challenge is that Pretoria cannot properly strategise “in the dark”, so to speak. However, the uncertainty presents an opportunity for an innovative negotiation strategy based on Pretoria’s comparative and competitive advantages.
As I indicated in previous iterations, Pretoria should consider infusing a dose of realism in its foreign policy. As Trump upends the world order, it is time for a realist doctrine in SA’s foreign policy, especially when dealing with a realist-oriented partner such as the current US administration. A realist-focused negotiation strategy will empower South Africa in understanding its strategic strengths when engaging with Washington.
In realpolitik, South Africa is of strategic significance to the United States due to Pretoria’s regional hegemonic status in a world that has fragmented into regional blocs or multipolarity. As Pretoria crafts its negotiation strategy with the US, it should keep in mind that Washington’s grand focus is ultimately on countering China.
In this regard, South Africa must be prepared to make some concessions to the US that may be uncomfortable to Beijing - here Pretoria’s negotiators must be solely guided by the country’s economic and commercial national interests. The negotiators would be obliged to make a clear separation between the ANC and South Africa’s foreign policy, a distinction that has been worryingly blurred in the past couple of years.
When South African negotiators arrive in Washington, they would be expected to have “cards” on them, to borrow Trump’s term. While the usual practice in such negotiations would be having Dirco as a lead department supported by the DTIC, the nature of South Africa’s envisaged negotiations would require a multi-departmental approach working closely with some key private sector players.
Pretoria would best be advised to engage in a whole-of-government approach, including bringing key private sector and industry players on board to gather and synchronise those cards.
This is because South Africa’s strength with regards to the US currently lies in the country being a regional hegemon, and its critical minerals endowments.
South Africa’s regional hegemonic status, albeit hesitantly exercised and sometimes contested, allows Pretoria to make assertions around the SADC’s own endowment in critical minerals. South Africa has some of the largest deposits of chrome, manganese, fluorspar, platinum group metals, vanadium, zirconium and titanium.
South Africa must offer to collaborate with the US on the exploitation and development of critical minerals value chains, for the benefit of both nations.
Pretoria should carry the region to those negotiations, and highlight the graphite, lithium and cobalt endowments in Mozambique, Zimbabwe and the DRC. All are within the sphere of Pretoria’s strategic influence, with their minerals unfortunately currently subject to bad deals with China.
The discussion in Pretoria around critical minerals tends to focus on renewable energy and technologies. This logic must be tweaked when Pretoria engages with Washington and be presented, at best, from a chips and semiconductor lens and, at worst, from a military-industrial complex perspective. The Trump administration views critical minerals as key to the development of US competitiveness in cutting-edge military technologies.
It is for this reason that South Africa should, in preparation for engagement with the US, have a mapping of domestic corporate geoeconomics players. In this regard, mining companies such as Richards Bay Minerals - which produces vanadium, zirconium, titanium and other rare earths - must be consulted.
Similarly, a company such as South32, which produces manganese, must be brought on board, as must Anglo Platinum, among other companies. In a nutshell, the Minerals Council South Africa is key in developing Pretoria’s US strategy.
While these are foreign firms, there is a general understanding and acceptance that the current geopolitical environment has transformed corporations into geoeconomic actors. Corporations invested in South Africa have been shielded from this phenomenon - until now.
It would be worthwhile for Dirco to bring on board the Department of Defence, especially with regard to crafting a strategy on how South African defence firms such as Armscor, Denel and Mintek can collaborate with their US counterparts in the development of military technologies using the country’s critical skills.
This may provide a way of fulfilling South Africa’s goal of developing critical minerals at source rather than shipping them away to China, as is currently the case. Bringing in the Department of Defence and firms to the negotiations will strengthen South Africa’s national security-centric view of the US towards critical minerals.
President Trump has allocated almost a trillion dollars to the US Department of Defense, meaning there are funds to develop some of the critical minerals in South Africa to produce chips and semiconductors, and achieve a win-win outcome in the negotiations.
Dirco as a lead department - working together with the DTIC, the DMRE, the Minerals Council SA, the Department of Defence, select mining firms and other stakeholders - can assemble enough cards to achieve successful negotiation outcomes with the US.
The envisaged engagements must be premised on a strong linkage between critical strategic minerals and the development of military technology value chains, and not renewable energy. DM
SA needs a trump card such as Thabo Mbeki to deal with the new Trump reality
While Pretoria may seem to be entering into US negotiations on the back foot due to the plethora of issues that the Trump administration has thus far raised, all is not lost to still make a compelling offer to the US.
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