SA’s fickle foreign policy means it has no principled approach towards global crises

Monday, 6 November was a busy day for South African diplomacy as it sought to find its footing following a disastrous year of alignment with Russia and flirtation with Iran.

The two events of significance which occurred were the meeting between the international relations minister, Naledi Pandor, and her Ukrainian counterpart, Dmytro Kuleba, in Pretoria, and the decision to recall South Africa’s diplomats from Israel.

The meeting with Kuleba follows a fractious year of entanglement with Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, including a serial refusal to condemn the invasion of Ukraine in the United Nations and the scandal surrounding the docking of the Russian arms carrier, Lady R, by moonlight at the Simon’s Town Naval Base.

Ramaphosa went so far as to say that not allowing Putin to attend the BRICS Summit in South Africa this August would be “a declaration of war”. When it became clear that he would lose his court bid to get Putin into the country, he changed tack and persuaded Putin to attend the summit virtually.

As it turns out, the BRICS Summit pretty much followed the Putin playbook, proposing to admit Iran, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia and Argentina to the group. Putin, speaking virtually, was moved to say: “I would like to note, as it turned out this was challenging work and President Ramaphosa showed unique diplomatic mastery as we negotiated all the positions including when it comes to BRICS expansion.”

With talks with the US over the renewal of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (Agoa) subsequently under way and US senators and congressmen starting to ask for South Africa’s exclusion, Pandor’s meeting with Kuleba sent a signal that South Africa was, in fact, pivoting back to neutrality.

“We are one of the few countries around the regions of the world that are able to speak to both Ukraine, as well as Russia,” Pandor said after the meeting. 

She noted “that Ukraine then, as part of the Soviet Union, provided to the freedom struggle”, a significant editing of the narrative that South Africa was closer to Russia because of its assistance to the exiled ANC.

She went so far as to say that she hoped to “use this bilateral relationship to build a greater African partnership”.

A cynic might observe that it would be in Russia’s interests to have a loyal friend like Ramaphosa become a key negotiator in the conflict.

And, it is apparent that most South Africans condemn Russia’s aggression and that continued support for the Kremlin will not play well in next year’s election.

Be that as it may, the optics are much better for South Africa as it projects itself as a neutral party that can talk to all sides.

Double standards