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South Africa’s trade ties with its global frenemies grows more complicated by the day

Bhaso Ndzendze
By Bhaso Ndzendze
25 Oct 2024
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The DA has distanced itself from President Ramaphosa’s reference to Russia as an ‘ally and friend of our nation’. The ANC’s frenemies are no longer de facto South Africa’s frenemies; some of these countries now have decidedly solid friends in the new Cabinet.

In the past three weeks, two developments have shone a spotlight on South Africa’s ties with countries that could best be described as its frenemies – that is, states with which there is an economically warm but politically cold relationship.

The first key event was the ANC’s decision to remove Obed Bapela as deputy chair of the party’s international relations sub-committee following what seems to have been an unsanctioned trip to Morocco. The trip was problematic for the ANC because it was allegedly misrepresented as an official trip to another country with which South Africa has no formal diplomatic relations due to its occupation of the Western Sahara territories.

The second notable event was the sudden instruction by the South African government for the removal of Taiwan’s Taipei Liaison Office in South Africa from Pretoria by the end of October, a move which seemed to come out of nowhere.

Are these moves in keeping with the economic reality of South Africa’s trade, and what can they tell us about the state of foreign policy under the coalition government of national unity?

A closer look at each frenemy relationship exposes the disconnect between political and economic foreign policy, a fact which may spell trouble for the government.

Morocco


The irony of Bapela’s trip is that trade relations between South Africa and Morocco have been growing regardless of the government’s official position. South Africa’s trade with Morocco has been booming in the post-Covid period. South Africa’s imports from the north African country have grown from R979.7-million in 2021 to R2.19-billion as of 2023.

In turn, South African exports have grown from R1.5-billion in 2021 to R6.5-billion in 2022, before moderating down to R2.17-billion in 2023. Most of this trade consists of energy and automotive exports by South Africa, and imports of such diverse goods as fisheries, agriculture and electronics from Morocco.

Taiwan


The order to remove Taiwan’s offices from Pretoria was reportedly due to pressure from the government of China, which claims Taiwan as its renegade province to be reincorporated under Beijing’s rule in the future, including by force.

If true, it would seem South Africa’s sovereignty is an afterthought for the compliant government, at least where China is concerned. It also forms part of a longer pattern in the past decade which has seen China press its partners, including Nigeria in 2017, to remove Taiwanese representation away from administrative capitals in an attempt to make the island politically irrelevant and forgotten.

Yet Taiwan, with which South Africa has had no formal relations since 1998, is among the country’s major trade partners. Despite dropping recognition in favour of China, a policy reiterated by President Cyril Ramaphosa during this year’s Focac summit, the island territory still sends billions worth of goods to South Africa, and buys billions more in return.

Over the past three years, imports from Taiwan have grown from R10.7-billion to R13.2-billion, while exports to Taiwan have grown from R11.57-billion to R17.2-billion. Taiwan is a source of electronic and manufacturing inputs (including much-needed integrated circuits or “computer chips”, of which the island is the world’s leading producer).

Rwanda


Another of South Africa’s frenemy states is Rwanda. There have been disagreements over Pretoria’s refusal to repatriate political dissidents to Rwanda, and there are accusations of assassinations or assassination attempts in South Africa. This has seen retaliatory expulsions of diplomats since 2014.

On the other hand, the ongoing conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has so far claimed nine South African soldiers’ lives. They are deployed there as part of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC), which began in December last year.

They likely died from attacks by M23, a rebel militia linked to the Rwandan government. Dozens more have been injured. While South Africa and Rwanda may not officially be at war, they are not in a state of peace either.

All the while, South Africa’s imports from Rwanda have grown from R21-million in 2021 to R37-million by 2023, while exports to Rwanda have grown from R337.8-million in 2021 to R715.01-million in 2023. Ironing out the differences is reportedly one of President Ramaphosa’s main foreign policy objectives.

Ukraine


Ukraine can be said to have become a frenemy for South Africa in February 2022 when Russia invaded its territory, and South Africa’s initially strong reaction against Moscow’s aggression was followed by vacillation and even accusations of implicit support.

Elements within South Africa’s government perceive the Russia-Ukraine war as a proxy conflict between dominant Nato and the global South. South Africa has subsequently sought to play the role of peacemaker, but its continued close ties to Russia, a fellow BRICS member, have alienated Ukraine.

The war-afflicted Ukrainian economy experienced a substantial decline in 2022, with its GDP falling by 29%. It may be because of this that Ukraine’s exports to South Africa declined from R729.4-million in 2021 to R629-million in 2022, and then to R271-million in 2023. On the other hand, South African exports have held steadily, moving from R437-million in 2021 to R480-million in 2023.

Importantly, Ukraine has support within the new government in South Africa. Former opposition leader and now Agriculture Minister John Steenhuisen has expressed solidarity with the Ukrainian people numerous times. He now has the official means to engage with the country more substantively.

Israel


By far, the most frenemy-like relationship South Africa currently exhibits is with Israel. In January this year, millions all over the world were glued to their screens as the International Court of Justice heard South Africa’s case against the Middle Eastern country over its plausibly genocidal war conduct in Gaza following the gruesome attacks on Israel on 7 October 2023.

Its finding of the need to protect Gazans from plausible genocide notwithstanding, trade between the two nations has been noticeable. Last year saw R3.9-billion worth of South African exports to Israel. While South Africa has been importing less and less Israeli goods, it still supplies Israel with 15% of its coal (as noted by Suraya Dadoo), making it the second-largest supplier behind Russia.

Possible coalition implications


What does all this (particularly the Taiwan removal) mean for the coalition government? While the other parties have been silent on the Taiwan move, the Democratic Alliance (DA) has issued a statement critical of the removal, which is managed by the Department of International Relations and Cooperation, headed by an ANC minister.

The DA’s statement regarded the action as unilateral on the part of the ANC, reminding the once-dominant party that it has government partners with which it must consult.

Such actions, seemingly out of nowhere and at the behest of China, risk establishing precedent for unilateral actions in foreign affairs, especially as most government departments that are headed by non-ANC ministers have foreign affairs desks of their own.

We might soon observe a tit-for-tat set of moves, with the DA, or even other coalition partners, undertaking visits or signing agreements with countries that are anathema to the ANC or its position – perhaps Israel or Ukraine.

Already, in light of the ongoing BRICS summit, the DA has issued yet another statement distancing itself from President Ramaphosa’s reference to Russia as an “ally and friend of our nation”.

The reverse is also true: the ANC’s frenemies are no longer de facto South Africa’s frenemies; in the wake of the coalition reality, some of these countries now have decidedly solid friends in the new Cabinet.

While these contradictions on foreign policy could be managed or ignored when the ANC was the sole governing party, they are being sharpened in the aftermath of the May election.

It is on foreign policy that the coalition government’s ability to hold will be most tested. DM

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