On the path to democracy, stability in Mali requires more inclusive national dialogue

Most of Mali’s political parties boycotted the national dialogue organised by the country’s transitional authorities from 13 April to 10 May. The Inter-Malian Dialogue for Peace and National Reconciliation (IMD) was presented as an initiative to restore peace and social cohesion through “consensual solutions”. 

But most parties denounced it, along with the government’s suspension in April of all political activities. On 10 July, that suspension was lifted. In the spirit of the IMD, the government should now initiate talks with those groups that didn’t participate in the national dialogue, in order to unite all Malians around solving the country’s challenges. 

According to the Dialogue Steering Committee, 3,000 Malians took part in the IMD. The final phase, which saw the adoption of 300 recommendations, brought together state representatives, 160 delegates from the country’s different regions, 26 delegates from the Malian diaspora, three refugee representatives and eight university delegates.

Two of the recommendations have attracted the most attention. One was the three- to five-year extension of the transition from a military junta to democratic civilian government. The other was the modification of Article 9 of the transition charter to allow President Assimi Goïta to stand in the next presidential election.

Goïta took power after leading a coup by the Malian army in May 2021. The country has been in transition since before then – when an earlier coup in August 2020 overthrew the elected president, Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta. Mali’s transition was due to end in February 2022 but was extended until 24 March 2024.

The national dialogue comes just months after the Malian military authorities’ decision – taken jointly with Burkina Faso and Niger’s coup leaders – to form the Alliance of Sahel States and withdraw from the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas). The three breakaway countries accuse Ecowas of being influenced by “foreign powers”. They are also unhappy with the institution’s sanctions against them and its lack of support in their fight against terrorism. 

Even though the withdrawal takes effect only in January 2025, all three countries’ transitional authorities have apparently absolved themselves from any commitment to Ecowas, including the transition deadlines agreed to with the regional bloc. On 6 July, the three signed a confederation treaty reaffirming their exit, two days before Ecowas held its 65th summit. 

While concerns that the IMD outcomes will prolong Mali’s transition are valid, several of the dialogue’s other recommendations are also worthy of attention. One was to open “doctrinal dialogue with the so-called jihadist armed groups”. This isn’t new – it was one of the flagship measures of both the 2017 National Accord Conference and the 2019 Inclusive National Dialogue, both held under Keïta’s presidency. However, action was never taken because Mali’s strategic ally at the time, France, opposed the principle. 

The Malian authorities’ determination to take control in solving the country’s crises presents an opportunity to start engaging with extremist groups. Such talks could complement military interventions, which to date have been Mali’s favoured counterterrorism approach. 

To maximise the momentum presented by the IMD, conditions must be created that encourage combatants from Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), Islamic State – Sahel Province and associated actors to disengage from these armed groups. Those conditions must be based on a good understanding of why people join up in the first place.

Dialogue is needed not just with jihadist groups, but with “all Malian armed movements”, as the IMD recommends. After the government retook northern towns in January, in particular Kidal, it dissolved the 2015 Algiers Peace Agreement signed under international mediation. The towns had been under the armed groups’ control since 2012, and the agreement maintained a ceasefire and ensured the peaceful reunification of the country. 

As a result, most of the significant armed groups from the north – gathered within the political platform called the Permanent Strategic Framework for Peace, Security and Development (PSF) – declined to participate in the IMD. They denounced the initiative for excluding debates on “the uniqueness, secularism of the State and the integrity of the territory”.

Resuming talks with groups in northern and central Mali is vital to resolving the insurgency that has resurfaced periodically since the country’s 1960 independence. This will require a carefully coordinated approach involving both armed rebels and jihadists, as strong historical, strategic and community ties exist between them. In 2012, the occupation of the north was jointly led by the Tuareg rebellion and Islamist militants, and last March, a former PSF military commander joined JNIM. 

As the three Alliance of Sahel States countries strengthen their political integration, they should also coordinate on dialogue with jihadist groups, given the cross-border nature of extremists’ activities. 

For Mali’s transitional bodies to diligently implement the IMD recommendations, as promised by Goïta, political tensions must be defused. The lack of a broad political consensus on the extension of the transition deadline increases the government’s crisis of legitimacy. 

Unlike the 2022 extension, this one comes during a particularly difficult socioeconomic context. The government is struggling to overcome an electricity supply crisis that is damaging the country’s economy, people’s incomes and quality of life, and eroding public support for Goïta’s administration. 

The IMD recommended “taking appropriate measures to consolidate democratic gains, and ensure respect for the principles and rules of the democratic game”. To avoid losing more support, the authorities must resume dialogue with all political groups, and agree on how to manage the country’s multiple challenges. The political framework for consultation suggested by the IMD could be a mechanism for doing so. As a first step, the framework could allow all stakeholders to agree on an electoral agenda to end the transition. DM

Fahiraman Rodrigue Koné, Project Manager, Sahel and Fodé Maciré Dramé, Consultant, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Regional Office for West Africa, the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin.

First published by ISS Today.