There cannot be any confidence in Zimbabwe’s upcoming polls ‒ and their quality matters enormously

Elections in Zimbabwe since 2000 have not passed the test of best practice. Each one has led to electoral disputes in the courts and negative reporting by reputable election observer groups. 

However, the political context was very different in each of those elections. Some of them (2000, 2005 and 2013) took place after long periods without civil strife, while others were held in a climate of economic turmoil or serious political violence (2002, 2008 and 2018). 

In each of those elections the pre-election periods were very different, as were the polls. And apart from 2008, every election saw Zanu-PF elected into government.

The election in 2023, however, takes place in a wholly different context. First, the country has not been in such dire circumstances before, with inflation rising rapidly, the economy sagging to unprecedented depths, food insecurity at world-beating levels and most of the population living below the poverty line. Scarcely the conditions in which a government is likely to be re-elected.

The consequences for Zimbabwe and the region are too serious for it to be business as usual following another failed Zimbabwean election.

Audit of the pre-election environment

• The lack of independence in the ZEC remains a significant concern;


• Voter registration remains a concern, both because of the low uptake by citizens and the difficulties in getting identity documents;


• The non-availability of the voters’ roll and the impeding of independent audits remain problems;


• Voter education remains constrained and unduly controlled; and


• The extreme political polarisation in Zimbabwe creates unfavourable political tensions for the holding of peaceful elections, as well as making the likelihood of a level playing field remote.

In many ways, the pre-election process looks worse than it did in 2018.

Pillar 1: Information

• Multiple recommendations have been made by domestic and international observers about the need to ensure a non-partisan public press and media;


• The degree to which journalists self-censor out of fear, and the risks in reporting and attending public meetings. It was evident from the discussions that freedom of expression, movement and association are severely restricted for the independent press and media;


• Meetings of the CCC are banned or disrupted, sometimes violently;


• The levels of hate speech, and the casting of opposition political parties as enemies, preclude the notion that this is a competition to persuade the citizenry which party has the best policies to govern the country and meet their aspirations;


• Citizens both fear elections and elect not to participate other than by voting; and


• The Private Voluntary Organisations Act will affect domestic observation of elections and the inhibiting of independent collection of data – especially about the counting of votes ‒ about the election.

Pillar 2: Inclusion 

• The impunity of state institutions;


• The partisan behaviour of traditional leaders;


• The partisan nature of institutions, such as the Zimbabwe Republic Police, that should be tasked with ensuring inclusion and insulation;


• The role of youth militia;


• Political violence, and all the other methods of inhibiting free participation in elections – intimidation, hate speech, partisan access to resources and judicial harassment – were all flagged as worsening; and


• Concerns about the partisan behaviour of traditional leaders, and the frank statements by traditional leaders about support for Zanu-PF in flagrant violation of the constitution.

Pillar 3: Insulation

• The right to register has been impeded by the difficulty in getting the requisite identity documents necessary for registration as a voter;


• Discrimination in favour of rural residents in getting access to identity documents and registering as voters;


• Continued complaints about the allocation of polling stations between rural and urban areas, and often the very long delays for urban voters;


• The need to improve the transparency of the counting process and remove the insistence that only the ZEC is entitled to publish results;


• Little evidence that the recommendations by local and international observers have been taken on board by either the ZEC or the government;


• The role of domestic observers is crucial in the effectiveness of outside observers, since few of the latter can provide the breadth of cover or the extended time that domestic observers can; and


• The Private Voluntary Organisations Act will seriously impede domestic observation through the burdensome conditions imposed on NGOs.

Pillar 4: Integrity

• The lack of independence in the ZEC remains a significant concern. There were frequent references to the apparently partisan affiliation of some of the commissioners, and to the presence of staff who have unclear affiliation to the military;


• Voter registration remains a concern, both because of the low uptake by citizens and the difficulties in getting identity documents;


• The non-availability of the voters’ roll, and the impeding of independent audits remains a problem, as in the past;


• Voter education remains constrained and unduly controlled;


• The failure of best practice on delimitation and an absence of impartiality and equality; and


• Representativeness, non-discrimination and transparency.

Pillar 5: Irreversibility

• Partisan judicial processes, both during the pre-election process and in electoral petitions;


• Undue delaying of petitions;


• Unnecessary and harmful curtailing of petitions;


• Weaponising of the judicial system through spurious prosecutions (Mahere) or denial of bail (Sikhala); and


• Failure to follow through on judgments (Charumbira and contempt).

Conclusions