‘Transition fatigue’ in South Sudan ramps up tensions amid deadly clashes

Recent deadly clashes between South Sudan’s government and opposition forces reveal the deeper problems plaguing the country. The conflict was triggered by a power reshuffle that started in October 2024 and intensified last month. But the roots of the dispute lie in the government’s enduring political and security problems. Tensions have now escalated nationwide. 

In early February, President Salva Kiir Mayardit dismissed several officials from the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO) without consultation. They included two of the five vice-presidents and the intelligence chief, who were replaced with Kiir’s close allies. 

This sparked violent clashes in mid-February between the country’s army – the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF) – and fighters linked to First Vice-President Riek Machar’s SPLM-IO in northeastern Nasir County. The government deployed additional troops to Nasir, but opposition forces captured the military base there on 4 March. 

Tensions soared on 7 March when a United Nations (UN) helicopter evacuating SSPDF soldiers from Nasir came under fire. The army’s commander, Major General Majur Dak, 27 of his soldiers, a UN crew member and others were killed. 

This led to heavy SSPDF deployment near Machar’s residence in Juba and the detention of key SPLM-IO figures, including the deputy army chief and three national ministers. No official reason was given for their arrest. They were replaced with lower-ranking officials close to Kiir, which sidelined the SPLM-IO and further escalated tensions. 

The Nasir conflict and the detentions and reshuffling of opposition members violate the 2018 peace agreement’s permanent ceasefire and power-sharing provisions. However, these weren’t isolated incidents. Many security confrontations and challenges have blocked implementation of the power-sharing arrangement. 

Kiir’s frequent cabinet reshuffling is widely seen as a strategy to consolidate power and marginalise opposition leader Machar. These actions reignite tensions between the signatories, who constitute the Transitional Government of National Unity, and their armed allies. Troops on both sides resort to violence, further destabilising the nation and jeopardising the peace deal. 

These security and political issues are rooted in prolonging the country’s transition. The deadline has been extended four times since 2018 due to a lack of pre-election preparations, resulting in the signatories shifting their economic and security positions.

The peace deal stipulated the establishment of unified armed forces made up of the various political parties’ armies. This has not yet happened, leaving fragmented armed groups with shifting loyalties and grievances to clash with each other and government forces. Political and armed alliances that felt excluded have defected, split from their group or resorted to violence to assert their demands, jeopardising the fragile peace agreement. 

But unlike before, both Kiir and Machar have apparently become disjointed from their allies and armed followers, leaving the latter to resort to violence.

With time, parties’ objectives and command and control structures have broken down. Machar, for example, doesn’t seem to have his previous attachment to and influence over his followers. In several instances his generals have split, defected or not complied with his orders. In the recent Nasir clash, Machar reportedly pleaded with his affiliated armed forces to not kill Dak – but they did so anyway.

Recent political developments reflect growing mistrust within the ruling coalition. Kiir’s repeated shuffling of senior officials has alienated allies and their forces, as happened with the former security chief, General Akol Koor Kuc, who was fired in October 2024. The fallout led to violent clashes in Juba between the presidential guard and Kuc’s armed forces on 21 November 2024, reigniting tensions between former and new factions.

The drop in South Sudan’s oil revenue has also deepened the rift between Kiir and his allies and their armed forces. Oil exports account for 90% of the country’s revenue, and Sudan’s ongoing conflict has constrained this vital economic lifeline. Disruptions saw export volumes drop from 186,000 barrels a day in January 2024 to just 58,000 by December that year. 

With unresolved export issues destabilising South Sudan’s revenue, Kiir is struggling to control his political and security allies. The lack of resources threatens to disrupt the patronage system that has historically sustained governance in the country, and could weaken the president’s power base. This also explains his recent cabinet and security sector revamps. 

Political allies and armed groups could now seek alternative sources of funding or power, changing how the 2018 peace agreement is implemented. Donor fatigue after multiple extensions of the transitional period further limits available resources. 

The cumulative effect of extending the transition is inadequate security sector arrangements, fragmented political alliances and a shortage of resources to implement the peace deal. The current transitional term must be treated as the final opportunity to rescue the fragile peace deal and move the country towards stable governance.

The deal’s guarantors – including the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, African Union and Western embassies – are concerned about the recent escalation of tensions. They should ensure key milestones are met to facilitate elections scheduled for December 2026, including establishing a unified, operational army and functioning electoral institutions.

During past transition extensions, the guarantors’ attention was shared with the pressing conflicts in Ethiopia’s north and Sudan. Given the fragile nature of the current transitional term, which started last month, the parties to the peace agreement should hold frequent, meaningful engagements to minimise the damage of current clashes and focus on completing the required milestones. DM 

Selam Tadesse Demissie, Researcher, Horn of Africa Security Analysis, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Addis Ababa.

First published by ISS Today.