US-SA relations among key bilateral tussles to watch as Africa readies for Trump comeback

President Joe Biden’s recent trip to Angola – the first state visit by a US president in nine years – has highlighted America’s renewed engagement with Africa. But as Donald Trump prepares for his second term in office, questions arise about the future of US-Africa relations, and whether this engagement will continue. 

Trump’s first term, characterised by an inward-focused “America First” agenda, showed the need for Africa to recalibrate its strategies – particularly in strategic geopolitical and security engagements. Several key issues at bilateral, regional and continental levels will be affected by his second-term policies and the priorities of his inner circle. 

Trump’s return presents African countries with an opportunity to take a proactive stance in shaping their political and economic relations with the US and developing resilient strategies instead of reacting to shifting US policies. 

Key bilateral relationships, particularly between the US and South Africa, are expected to shift – stemming from US opposition to South Africa’s International Court of Justice (ICJ) case against Israel over Gaza, and the country’s close ties with China and Russia. 

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In particular, South Africa’s neutral position on the Russia-Ukraine war will be a point of tension in a second Trump presidency. The president is also opposed to South Africa’s growing partnership with China, which is amplified by China’s efforts to direct global trade away from the US and BRICS’ attempt at de-dollarisation, a move criticised by Trump.

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Notable figures in Trump’s camp are also likely to affect US-South Africa relations. For example, Senator Marco Rubio, the presumptive secretary of state and a strong critic of China, condemned South Africa’s decision to downgrade Taiwan’s embassy.

Trump’s pick for UN ambassador, Elise Stefanik, was part of a petition condemning South Africa’s ICJ case against Israel, calling it an attempt to “demonise” Israel. Michael Waltz led a push to review US-South Africa ties, a move Biden resisted, but with Waltz as Trump’s pick for national security adviser, it could gain momentum. 

South Africa assumed the G20 chair on 1 December and will host the 2025 Johannesburg summit. The country now faces a dual challenge of maintaining neutrality while addressing growing geopolitical divisions – seeking to build consensus among G20 members and an expanded BRICS group while managing a more isolationist US under Trump’s leadership. 

This also presents an opportunity for Pretoria to spotlight African priorities on the global stage, especially with the African Union (AU), now a full member of the G20. With the US succeeding South Africa as chair, this transition could pave the way for a possible Cyril Ramaphosa-Trump engagement within the year, offering a critical window for dialogue and potential recalibration of relations.

In east Africa, Kenya’s newly elevated status as a major non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (MN-Nato) ally could offer Nairobi some bargaining chips in the international space. Despite Trump’s America First policy and negative views on Nato, he may temper his approach by focusing on strategic bilateral partnerships with MN-Nato allies, such as Kenya. 

The new US administration will probably continue its security relations in east Africa and the Horn – largely due to Rubio’s visit to Kenya and Somalia in 2019, part of a bipartisan oversight mission for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. 

Furthermore, because of the declining US security influence in west Africa, resulting from successive coups and the subsequent expulsion of US troops from Niger, maintaining the security partnership with Kenya is expected to remain a priority.

And given the Kenya-led Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission in Haiti, US-Kenya bilateral engagements might move the needle towards securing commitment to America’s more than $300-million funding pledge to the mission. Although this would be a tall order given the Trump camp’s reluctance to fund the UN, and peacekeeping in particular – despite the US proposing the resolution to replace the Kenyan-led MSS with a UN mission. 

Trump’s preference is for strategic partners to take up more of the burden without the US overextending its resources – so Kenya must look beyond the US for support.

Contentious Horn of Africa